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P R E F A C E 
Since the last two and a half decades the Indian 
Ocean has become the focus of world attraction. An earst-
while peaceful and geographically remote area acquired 
greater significance in the United States Iforeign policy 
strategy since the later half of the 1960's, which ulti-
mately resulted in Soviet interest and presence in the 
region. The factors contributing to the developments in 
the region are the assertive global strategy of the two 
Super Powers, The Soviet march the ocean highway to domi-
nate the region and weaken the Western influence. The United 
States understands the importance of maintaining naval sup-
remacy in this ocean area and is willing to use naval power 
to influence the course of history. The historical and 
political framework, outlined in the first chapter, provides 
important clues for an understanding and evaluation of 
present trends. 
The second chapter deals with United States foreign 
policy and stresses the United States policy towards the 
Indian Ocean which, it would be more appropriate to regard. 
Is an"elaboration and reinterpretation of Captain A,?. 
Mahan's theory of Sea Power. British withdrawal and her 
farewell to the 'East of Suez* policy gave impetus to Mahan's 
theory to be successfully implemented in this area also. 
it 
The United Stat«a r^lacement of Great Britai^ i through a 
British- U.S. agreement of 1966 helped the United States 
maintaining her presence in the area. In 1972 another 
agreement provided for the construction on Diego Garcia 
of a United States Havy Communication facility, and four 
years later a superceding agreement allowed for the harb-
our, fuel storage and refuelling facilities, made the 
United States an unchallenged power of the region. 
The third chapter gives an over all picture of the 
Super Powers interests, policies, their characteristic 
modes of behaviour, coii^ petition and approaches adopted by 
them in this politically unstable, economically rich and 
strategically vulnerable area of the world. Both Super 
Powers, in their attempt to balance each other, created 
imbalance in the region which resulted in putting forward 
a ^ace Zone proposal on the part of the littoral states. 
Finally^^an attempt is being made to understand 
legally and from the point of view of power politics, 
the United States naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Sino« 
there is not much literature cm the subject* the dieser« 
tation may be liable to strong criticism and may lead to 
scHne fruitful conclusion, apart from that given in the 
present one. 
CHAPTER 1 
THC INDIAN OCEAN 
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The Indian Ocean, the third largest after the Atlantic 
and the Pacific, has about one quarter of the wori<!l%popu^ 
lation living in the countries whose shores its waters 
touch. The strategic position and the vast mineral resources 
of the Indian Ocean, stretching from the Strait of Malacca 
to the shores of Eastern Africa and Persian Gulf, have rais'* 
ed the stakes in the region. 
The birth of this ocean is sc^ nething of an amazing 
hypothesis. Alfred tiegtsner, a distinguished German meteoro* 
logist, has tried to prove that the entire land area of the 
world once formed a single huge continent, called the Pan* 
gaea. Later luner and solar gravitational pull and violent 
processes taking place deep inside the earth split this 
original continent into two proto-continents, Uirasia, in-
clwiling Europe, North America and the greater part of Asia 
in the Northern Hemisphere, and Gondwanaland in the Southern 
Hemisphere. Gondwanaland broke-up over the course of millions 
of years. Land areas subsided, wexre covered with waters, and 
became the floor of the ocean. As a result of the continental 
drift, coral atolls and reefs and the Maldives, LaecadiVes, 
Cocos and Chagos island arose in the shallow waters of the 
Indian Ocean.^ The Himaiytifl rose as a result of the collllit@il 
1. ALlflXANDER KONDRATOV? The Riddles of Three Oceans, 
(Translated from the Russian by I£ONARD STOKLITSKY^ 
Progress Publishers, 1974), pp. 125 and 127, 
m 
of the GcHidiranalattd with Asian landmasSf some 60 million 
years back with the consequent sq^ ieezing v^ of nud and 
sediments from the ancient ocean. 
United I9^ tates scientists claimed to have found, on the 
floor of the Indian Ocean, evidence to support the belief 
that India broke off from Gondvanaland at the Sooth Pole a 
hundred million years ago and migrated north until it collide 
ed with Asian landsiass. The Indian Ocean is supposed to 
have opened up in the wake of the drift of the Indian svb* 
3 
continent from the South fole. 
Apart from the continental drift theory, the other 
hypothesis of the ori0ln of the Indian Ocean is that the 
basin of the Ocean was formed as a result of a subsidence 
and oceanizatlon of the continental crust. 
2. Tiw proof of this scientific speculation has also been 
claimed to have been uncovered by scientists from the 
Scripps Institute of Oceanography, La Jolla, 
California, see TIK STAiHiSMMi (Delhi), April 22, 1972* 
3 . Tm STATESimi teelUa AiMTil 22 , 1972. 
4* tWCyCLOPAEPlA BR^AIiiiICA> Vol . 9, p . 310. 
Source: Based on Larry H Bowman t Ian Clarfc~|edsO, The 
Whichever may be the real cause of the birth of the 
Indian Ocean* the historical point of view is that the Ocean 
can be studied into two phases. The first was the 'ancient* 
Indian Ocean actually Known as 'Ii^iHon Pelagos* was limited 
5 
to the waters round the coast of India, *l^ rythraet»R nare* 
or the Erythraean Sea constitute the western part of the 
Ocean with its two principal arms, the Persian Gulf and the 
Sinus Arabia (today the Red Sea). The eastern part consist 
of the Gulf of Ganges or the Great Gulf, The *Mare Pradosim* 
or Green Sea, which extended beyond a line drawn from Cape 
Delg4u3o to the farthest shores of the Great Gulf* passing in 
the vicinity of Ceylion was the Vouthern most limit of the 
Ocean. 
In short, to the north of the Equator, i t was the 
'ancient' region well Known to the Mediterranean and Eastern 
sa i l or s , and to the south a 'modern* region explored for 
barely five hundred years by European navigators from the 
Atlantic .^ 
This d iv i s ion of the Indian Ocean was a r t i f i c i a l and 
tesiporary* Geographlefally, I t i s the most extensive part of 
5. The Erythraean Sea included today's Red Sea and the 
Arabian Sea. 
6. AIIGtfSTE TOUSSAIWT? History of the Indian Oceans 
(Trwislated by JUNE GUICHARKAUD, Routledge and m^m ^mkm-
I^ndon, 1966V p. 7. 
the South Asian reqion« with an area of about 73,5 mlllloa 
square k.m. In the west/ the Ocean's boundary lies along 
the meridian of Cape Agulhas to Antarctica at Queen Hand's 
Land. The Antarctica forms the Southern boundary along 60 
•outh latitude upto Fisher Bay. The dividjLng line betweptn 
the Pacific and the Indian Ocean is the meridian of the 
South-East Cape of Tasmania upto the %(estern boundary of 
Bass Strait, which makes Australias southern waters almost 
wholly a part of the Indian Ocean* Regarding the north* 
eastern boundary, the Singapore Strait and the Strait of 
Malacca might or might not be included in the Indian Ocean, 
Further up, the boundary is along the coasts of Thailand 
and Burma, till it swerves sharply to the west, dips down 
south to girdle round India and Sri Lanka, rises again to 
Pakistan's boundary and moves west once again. The northern 
boundary Includes the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea upto 30 
north latitude, where a narrow strip separates it from the 
Mediterranean, after which the eastern boundary of Africa 
7 takes over. 
Thus the Indian Ocean, t l ist l i e s soath of Asia and 
between Africa and A«stralia« extending south t o Antarctles, 
i s bounded by India, Pakistan and I ran t o the north i the 
7. MAHARAJ K. CHOPRA; India and the Indian Ocean, New 
Horizons, (New Delhi , 1982), pp . 10-11. 
Arabian Peninsula and Africa to the west; Australia* the 
Sunda Islands of Indonesia* the Malay Peninsular to the 
east; and Antarctic to the south. The entire region falls 
roughly between the latitudes 30° north and 60° south and 
longitudes 20° west and 120° east embracing belts of the 
Equator, the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn. 
The geographical structure resembles the Indian Qeeen 
to a bowl whose rim Is formed by the bordering lands* The 
potter. In his carelessness, has split a few fragments in 
the numerous Islands of the Indonesian Archipelago and the 
rim has broken at the extrlmlty of Pakistan, Afghanistan 
and Iran. 
The most outstanding and unique feature of the Indian 
Ocean, which distinguishes it from the Atlantic and the 
Pacific, is its characterstlcs of a land-locked sea. While 
the Atlantic and the Pacific are like gigantic highways, 
extending from pole to pole, the Indian Ocean looks like an 
9 
•Inverted W*, a vast gulf with two breaches formed by the 
8. Indian Council of World Affairs; Defence and Security 
in the Indian Ocean Area, (New Delhi 1958), p. 26. 
9. AUGUSTE TOUSSAINT; gp. cit, n. 6, p. 6. 
w 
Arabian Sea in the w«st and the Bay of Bengal in the eaat, 
separated by Southern India, Macklnder attached to it the 
significance of a great link area of "the World Island* 
of which the only effective political boundries are the 
Atlantic and the Pacific, 
The Indian Ocean was first explored by the Egyptians, 
Phoenicians* and iBdlans, They mad« long Journeys in thft 
northern part of the Indian Ocean during the l'* nillenioii 
B.C. In this northern portion, the western and eastern parts 
of the Indian Ocean underwent separate developisents and the 
Indian subcontinent ttws faces in two directions and «t the 
same time separates the two parts. In the west the Egyptiait 
and Persian empires, in the 2000 years B.C., also extended 
their influence seawards, later giving way to the Romans 
and Muslim Ari^s.^^ In 671 A.O. the Arabs sailed to Canton 
and also long the African coast. They had settlements in 
12 Madagascar and on the coast of Malabar and Qujrat in India. 
th The 7^ Century marked the culmination of Islamic saa 
power and the Arabs were the siasters of the Persian Gulf, 
^0* K.M^PAHIKKgRi India and the Indian Ocean (An Essay on 
the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History, tondon 
1945), p. 18. 
11 , DIETER BRAUN? The Indian Ocean, Region of Conf l i c t or 
Peace Zone? (Translated from the German by CARQ|t« QiUm^:: 
and KATHUiEW U^AiWARHE. Oxfor Univers i ty Press 198$)« p« 
12 . DEVEMDRA KAII^iiiyi The Indian Ocean, TowardsjPeace Zone, 
(Vikas, ftiw*illi,' 1#72) , p . 5 . 
With the decline of Abbasid in the 10^ *^  century A,D, 
and the rise of the Patimlds In Egypt* the centre of Islamic 
sea power shifted from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea, From 
9 to 15 century A.D,, therefore, the Ocean was used by 
raedlvael Arab and Persian pilots* as is evident from their 
writings. The Ultimate interest of Persian pilots aimed 
at exploiting sea as well as land routes, to ensure communl-
14 
cation between the Orient and the Occident, 
In the eastern part of the Indian Ocean, it were the 
Indians, the Malayans and the Chinese who travelled the 
seasl^ For India, the Vedas (1,500 B.C.) speak of sea voyages, 
and there appear to have been very active coastal trade in 
ancient India, There are numerous allusions in the Rig Weda 
to sea voyages and to ships with a hundred oars. The South 
Indian dynasties — Cheras, Pandyas and Cholas—extended 
their sea power to Malaya, Indonesia and Indo-China, Under 
Sri Vijaya Empire the Command of the Malacca Strait was in 
the hands of great Indian naval power from 5^ *^  to 10 
17 
century. In Chandragupta Maurya's time a Board of shipping 
1 3 . ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICAy V o l , 9 , p , 3 1 2 , 
1 4 . AUGUSTE TOUSSAINT; O p . c i t , n . 6 , p , 2 5 , 
1 5 . DIETER BRAUN? c p . C i t . n . 1 1 , p . 4 . 
1 6 . K.M. PANIKKER; p p , c i t , n , 1 0 , p . 2 3 , 
17. Ib id ; p . 33. 
was one of the six great departments of the Mauryan Emperors. 
At the head of It was a minister who dealt with all matters 
relating to shipping", including the navigations of the 
°ceans. 
To further east, Chinese were sucW a daring navigators 
of the eastern region of the Indian Ocean that the "Indian 
Ocean might well have become a Chinese lake from 1200 to 1433 
A.D,"^® This period saw the height of Chinese maritime acti-
vity in the Indian Ocean, By the Middle of the 15 century, 
they withdrew permanently from the Indian Ocean, But it was 
not until the arrival of the Portuguese and later, other 
European powers that a single maritime state could impose its 
sway on both the eastern and western extremities of the 
region. 
The close of the 15*^ ^ century marked the end of Asia's 
maritime supremacy in the Indian Ocean. The next 300 year's 
history of the Indian Ocean is the history of trade rivalries 
and aimed struggle among the Western European Powers, 
In 1497, it was Vasco da Gama, who sailed around 
Africa and started the Portuguese period. The Portuguese 
entry to the Indian Ocean was the continuation of the tradi-
tional quest for spices. They did not limit their activities 
18. AUGUSTE TOUSSAINT; op. tit, n. 6, p. 74. 
10 
to one region but extended their hold both in the eastern 
as well as western side to control the entire Indian Ocean, 
In the west, they captured Mozambique and Kilwa, the two most 
important muslira settlements on the African coast, and the 
islands of Socotra ^nd Ormus in order to command properly 
the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, They have Cochin, Goa, 
Daman and Diu on the west coast of India, On the eastern 
coast, Masulipatam and Negapatam on the Coromandel coast 
were secured by the Portuguese, In between the east and the 
west, Ceylon was also secured as a center point. Though the 
Portuguese failed to take proper advantage of the harbour 
facilities of Ceylon, yet Trincomalee might have proved a 
better power base than Goa, With their hold over Malacca in 
the Malayan Peninsul*,they have established a 'chain of bases' 
from west to east. Their succe'ss were due to a clear naval 
superiority over Asian ships and the establishment of key out 
posts on land which could act as strateoic bases for the navAl 
19 fleets and men left in charge of the trading operations. 
The Portuguese reigned the Indian Ocean for over a 
century. Their attempt to control the seaborne trade of the 
19, TAPAN RAYCHAUDHURI & IRFAN HABIB (eds); The Cambridge 
Economic History of India, Vol, 1: C,1200-C,1750 
(Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 382-383. 
11 
Indian sub-continent was made partially ineffective through 
corruption and administrative laxity on the part of their 
20 
officials in the Indies. Besides, they encountered decisive 
opposition, especially from Muslim Arabs on and off the east 
coast of Africa, and their control of the Malacca Strait 
was threatened by the Sultan of Achin in north-west 
Sumatra. 
The Dutch, British and the French followed the portu-
quese to the Indian Ocean, In the late 16 and early 17 
centuries, the Dutch, barred from the Lisbon market, entered 
the Indian Ocean, to procure pepper spices at their very 
source. They were prompted by purely commercial motives, 
unlike the Portuguese, and their operations were conducted 
and claims justified by the establishment of the Ver^enigd* 
Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), the United East India CcMi^ ahy 
of the Netherlands (in 1662), the first of its kind in Asia, 
the Dutch expelled the Portuguese from Malacca in 1641, and 
before the end of 17 century, also took from them Negapa* 
tarn, Ceylon, the Cape of Good Hope (which the portuguese 
had over looked), 
20, Ibid7 p. 385, 
21, DIETER BRAUN; ©p. cit, n, 11, p, 5. 
IS 
The extension of Dutch and Enqlish trade to India in 
the first decade of the 17* century and their subsequent 
activities in the well-known tradim cities such as Masuli-
patam and Surat owed a great deal of exigencies of inter-
Asian trade. But of greater importance wa| the possibility 
that Indian taxtiles and other products of the sub-continent 
might find a market in Europe itself. Gradually a distinct 
and a new pattern of trade emerged. The Dutch largely repla-
ced and took over the inter-Asian trade previously carried 
22 
on by the Portuguese, 
In the first decade of the 17 century the Dutch 
captured Tegenapatam and Pulicut and eventually transformed 
them into the main centre of Dutch trade in Coromandel, The 
headquarters, later,were shifted to Negapataro in 1690, In 
order to strike a decisive blow to Portuguese trade, the 
Dutch policy aimed at the capture of the cinnamon trade of 
Ceylon and elimination of the Portuguese pepper factories 
in Malabar, The Goa port was blockaded every trading season 
for tbn successive years from 1936, Malacca came under Dutch 
22, T4IPAN RAYCHAUDHURI & IRFAN HABIB (eds); • Op, cit, n.l9 
p. 387. 
13 
control in 1641. The foUowing years witnessed the conquests 
of Colombo and Cochin, 
The period from the f«ll of Malacca (1641) to the 
establishment of British in India (1815) was really one long 
interregnum during which no single power controlled the 
Ocean. The Dutch bad established a number of factories under 
yOC, Principal among them were at Surat, Cochin, Pulicut, 
Negapatam, Masulipatam and Hugli, 
During the 18^^ century, India's foreign trade under-
went a considerable expansion as a result of the tripartite 
participation of the Dutch, the English aod the French, In 
the 16*^ ^ century both the Dutch and English traders worked 
in cooperation with each other against the mighty "Estado 
da India". But in the 18^ *^  century Dutch power was challenged 
by the British, On the other hand, the French, from a modest 
and weak position, repidly ttmerged as a formidable competitor, 
Thus the struggle for the command of the Indian Ocean took 
a new dimension. The main ccMjpetltors were now the British 
and the French. Their longdrawn-owt struggle, on European 
and Asian territories has sometime* been called the "Second 
Hundred Years War?^^ 
23. ALVIN J. COTTRELI^ & R.M. BURRELL Ceds)? The Indian Ocean, 
Its Political, Economic and Military Importance,(Praeger 
Publishers, U.S.A. 1972), p. 7. 
1# 
The Portuguese were practically out of the picture. 
The British East India Company quickly succeeded in pene-
trating important areas of the Indian sub-continent, and 
protected its position mostly by treat^s with native rulers. 
The French, on the other hand, subsequently directed their 
interest to the western Indian Ocean and began by taking 
over Mauritius from the Dutch who had voluntarily abandoned 
it?* The British established themselves in Surat, in the Gulf 
of Combay and at Masulipatam, on the Coromandel coast. Later 
they moved from Surat to Bombay and from Masulipatam to 
Madras, Medras was superceded by Calcutta in 1773, 
In the following decades Britain strenqthened its 
position in the neighbouring countries of the Indian Ocean, 
The Britishers forged its Indian "Empire", founded its 
Singapore colony to safequard Burma — albeit not without 
difficulty — and towards the end of the 19 century 
took over the protectorate of the Malay Peninsula, Australia 
has been British since the begining of the century, Aden, 
in the Western Indian Ocean near the southern entrance to 
the Red Sea, became a British possession in 1839, In the 
th later half of the 19 century they occixpied Egypt in order to 
24, DIETER BRAUN; op, cit, n, 11, p, 5, 
19 
secure the new sea-route to India via Suez Canal, At the end 
of the 19 century Britain completely dominated over the 
whole of the Indian Ocean region by creating a protectorate 
in Zanzibar and by coloniaing Kenya. By 1900 Britain had 
turned the Indian Ocean into a British la]ce and had military 
control over all the important approaches and exits. Of the 
littoral states at that time, only Ethippia and Slam (later 
Thailand) remained formally independent, while all the others 
found themselves in varying degrees of (mostly direct) depen-
25 dence on one or other of the European powers. 
From the strategic point of view, the British navel 
supremacy in the Indian Ocean was founded upon the structure 
laid down by Affonso d* Albuquerque, the greatest European 
who was directly connected with the problems of Asia, He 
spoke of "the three keys" to the Indian Ocean, the Strait 
of Malacca and Singapore in the east; the Strait of Hormuz 
at the entrance to the Persian Gulf; and th« Strait of the 
26 Red Sea and Aden in the west. Although military technology 
and weapdn systems have changed with the passing of time and 
altered the methods of warfare and structures of power, but 
25. Ibid; p. 6. 
26. K.M. PANIKKER; The Strategic Problems of the Indian 
Ocean, (Allahabad, 1944), p. 5. 
I f i 
these geographical factors have remained of supreme strate-
gic importance since the 16 century. The British, having 
establish their sprawling base in the Indian Empire, foll-
owed this very pattern and succeeded ultimately in making 
27 the Indian Ocean a "mare clausum"-!. a closed Sea — to others 
with hostile intent. 
The construction of the Suez Canal in 19 century 
opened a new chapter in the history of the Indian Ocean, 
With the unchallenged British supremacy in the Mediterranean, 
and with the acquisition of authority over Egypt and the 
annexation of Cyprus, the Mediterranean route to India became 
a private subway for Britain, with controls at different 
stages— Gibraltar, Malta, Port Said and Aden, The Red Sea 
became an exclusively British sea lane, bolted and barred 
at both entrances, Aden assumed the importance it possessed 
during the time of Egyptian and Arabian navigation in the 
Indian Ocean, and it may be well said that the Suez Canal 
became, as events developed, the strongest link in the chain 
which bound India to Britain, The construction of the Canal 
also restored the importance of the traditional Red Sea 
route to Europe, that had been the famous highway over which 
27. RAVINDRA VARf^ Ay "The Indian Ocean in India's strategy 
and Diplomacy'; Indian Journal of Political Science, 
(Bhubaneswar, Orissa), Vol. XXV, No. 2, April/June 
1964, p. 40. 
17 
practically the entire trade of India with Europe had passed 
till Vasco da Gama arrived at Calicut and opened up the Cape 
^ 28 route. 
With the construction of the Canal and the discovery 
of oil in the Persian Gulf in 1890, Britain had to face 
competition from several quarters. In the Far East« America, 
by defeatino Spain, Occupied the Philippines in 1895, thus 
entering the Pacific Ocean as at least a potentially major 
naval power. Almost at the same time Japan, after defeatino 
China in a naval engagement, took the first ominous step 
towards annexation of Pormusa, These were the opening moves 
in the vast chessboard of the Pacific, In the Indian Ocean 
the French occupation of Madagascar in the nineties gave 
her a large territorial interest, and a base of great natural 
strength in Diego Suarez, which could in case of a break-
down of the naval power based on India, control the main 
29 
route of the Indian Ocean, 
During the first World War the Indian Ocean was only 
a secondary theater of operations* with two areas of loca-
lized hostilities; The Middle East and East Africa?^ In th« 
28. K.M. PANIKKER; op. cit, n. 10, p, 72. 
29. Ibid; p. 73. 
30. AUGUSTE TOUSSAINT; op. cit, n. 6, p. 228. 
18 
Middle East the conflict was essentially for 'Oil', which 
gradually developed into a large-scale movement against 
Turkey, In east Africa, the Germans in Tanqanika, although 
cut off from their homeland, put up a fine resistance but 
were finally overpowered. On Sea, hostilities were limited 
to German privateering raids, which failect however to dis-
rupt the allie's line of communication. 
The first World War was superficially a war of the 
Pacific but had changed the entire situation in the Indian 
Ocean. In the western Portion of the Indian Ocean, it was 
responsible for the transfer of control over the Middle East 
from Turkey to the British hands. Secondly, Britain had to 
secure the upperhand in the Middle East as she had no oil 
of her own, which has now replaced coal as fuel for various 
kinds of engins, including ship engin. 
In the Far East, after the fall of France and Italian 
intervention in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, Great 
Britain failed to make her position effective, Japan had also 
moved towards the south and occupied the Island of Hainan, 
opposite Tonkln« and also controlled the vast coastal area 
of China up to Canton, 
Strategically Britain had faced two serious consequ-
ences of the first World War, Firstly, as a result of the 
10 
war# Britain was forced to give up her naval ascendancy 
through treaties, such as concluded with Washington in 
1921-22, which put the American Navy on the footing of equa-
lity with the British, The second was the creation of trem-
endous competition for the British overse/is cable companies 
by the American companies. Now the British had to share 
had 
naval hegemony with the Americans which they had/in 1911 
with the Japanese, 
The system which prevailed throughout thel6 century 
was 'trade-oriented' and did not aspire, after conquest of 
territory, beyond a few islands and coastal towns. The 
British, who dominated the Indian Ocean for 150 years follow-
ed as well as extended the Portuguese system. Instead of 
confining themselves to a few towns or islands, however, 
they conquered large territories in all the three continents 
adjoining the Indian Ocean. The British followed a dual 
strategy aimed at economic and political control in this 
region. 
The second World War marked the closing days of 
British thalassocracy and opening of another interregnum 
similar to what followed the decline Qf Portuguese sea 
power in the 17 century. In theory the defense of the 
Indian Ocean was a British responsibility but the political 
awakening of Asia eventually took almost everywhere- the 
form of a revolt against the Europeans and more particularly 
the British yoke. Thus, inspite of defending the region, 
Britain herself was faced with a danger from the countries 
of the Indian Ocean itself. Thus the Indian Ocean is once 
again a naval void. 
Since the Second World War, new oiftside forces had 
begun to make an impact alongside the autochthonous aspira-
tions to independence in the colonized regions. After the 
war Russia's Sea power grew tremendously. In the beglnino 
their attention was directed towards the Mediterranean and 
the Pacific, but in 1957, Soviet warships passed throuoh 
the Suez Canal into the Indian Ocean for the first time in 
many years. Since then Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean 
has kept growing and so has the number of Soviet ships in 
the region. In the West, the United States emerged the 
strongest naval power from the World War II. U.S. naval 
policy was at first confined to the Mediterranean and the 
Pacific, leaving the Indian Ckrean outside the "American 
perimeter of defence? ^ ^ The situation seems to have chansed 
since 1960*8 and more particularly since the British 
announced intention to withdraw £rom *East of Suez* In 
1965. 
31. ALVIN J. COTTRELL & R.M. BURREU, (ftds) ; op. clt, n.23, 
p. 13. 
21 
Similar to that of the Indian Ocean, history shows 
that the islands of the Indian Ocean, namely Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Reunion, the C<»noros and the Seychelles, have pa-
ssed through the same successive phases of history under 
European influences. The first European explorers of the 
region were the Postuguese and Dutch seafarers who came in 
the 16 and 17 centuries. The islands were subsequently 
4,U 
caught up in the swirls of the 18 century mercantilistic 
rivalries, shifting alignments with the tides of comnercial 
and naval fortune. They all survived a hundred years or mor« 
of colonial slumber awakening in a post-war world that ha» 
32 largely discredited colonialism. 
An outstanding feature of the political history of 
the Indian Ocean is that at no time did a single littoral 
country ever exercise exclusive control across its face. 
The Indian Ocean do not have any major global power on its 
shores but history reveals that whenever the Ocean has been 
dominated, it has been dominated by external powers, parti-
cularly the West Europeans, Since the end of Second World 
War, the decolonization campaign backed by the Soviet Union 
resulted in the establishment of Communist governments in 
most of the independent countries of the region. West Asia 
was the only exception where Communist influence could not 
prevail. But the Israili attack on Sinai Peninsula backed 
32, PHILIP M. ALI£N; "Self-Determination in the Western 
by Anglo-French forces has completely alienated the sympa-
thies of the Arab world and seems to have opened the gete-
ways for the indirect penetration of the Soviet Union's 
33 influence, if not of Corwnunism, in the West Asian region. 
The latest (of that period,) Eisenhower doctrine for guaran-
teeing the security of this region has not been received 
with enough favour. West Asia seems to be divided on this 
question. While the Baghdad Powers have hailed the doctrine, 
the rest of the Arab world displayed a strong resentment 
against the implementation of such a plan. They feel strongly 
that the vacuum created by the recent hostilities in the West 
Asia should be filled by the countries of the region and not 
by any outside power. The Arabs and the Israeli's are still 
fighting endless wars because their approach to the problem 
of Israel is entirely different and their conclusions are 
completely irreconcilable, Israelis — and Zionists through-
out the world — regard the establishment of Israel as a 
great act of historic Justice, The Arabs, however, regard 
the birth of Israel as an unmittigated disaster for the 
three-quarters of a million Arabs dislodged in the process. 
The Arabs regard Zionists as European invaders backed by 
34 British and American imperialism. 
33, Indian Council of World Affairs; op. cit, n, 8, p. 147. 
34, Ibid; p. 148. 
These are the contradictions and political cross-currents 
that lead to political disunity and rivalry amongst the 
independent countries of West Asia. These states, while of 
minor military significance, have great strategic importance 
due to oil and the Suez Canal rout. 
Equally bitter problems are also present in the heart 
of the Indian Ocean region. The religious cleavage between 
Hinduism and Islam finds its present day political express-
ion in a number of outstanding disputes between India and 
Pakistan, Burma was caught by bitter rivalry between various 
political groups within the country which extends to provin-
cial separatist tendencies, Indonesia is in an analogous 
position. It is a bridge or a series of stepping-stones 
between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, The strategic 
significance of these Islands in a conflict between East 
Asia and the Americans was amply demonstrated by the course 
of World War II in the Pacific, The Malayan insurrection has 
entered a new phase with the assumption of independence by 
Malaya, 
Iran and Iraq, though not quite friendly towards each 
other, have disputes over the waters of the Shatt-al-Arab. 
These two neighbouring countries have triple significance in 
connection to the Indian Ocean, Firstly, they lie in the 
path of any Russian march southwards to the warm water ports 
m% 
of the Indian Ocean, Secondly, they have rich productive 
oilfields which supply Europe, India and the East, Finally, 
they lie astride the land route to the Indo-Pakistan 
35 
sxib-continent from Europe to Asia, 
The British and United State's interests in the Indian 
Ocean has grown considerably with the installation of the 
United States tracking station on Mahe* (Seychelles) in Nov, 
1965, Before 1965, the British Government conducted two 
years of surveys and negotiations and in Nov, 1965, the then 
British Prime Minister Herold Wilson in his policy decisions 
announced the formation of a new crown-colony, designated 
the "British Indian Ocean Territory* (BIOT), The new colony 
composed of several far-flung, nearly uninhabited shoals 
and atolls formerly under the administrative jurisdiction of 
Mauritius and Seychelles, Originally it consisted of four 
separate island groups scattered over the western and central 
sectors of the Ocean, all of which were detached from their 
previous governing authority. The government of Mauritius 
ceded the Chagos Archipelago, including the atoll of Diego 
Gargia, Seychelles ceded the three islands of Aldebra, 
Desroches and Farquah^r, but in 1976 London returned them to 
the new republic's sole control and jurisdiction. Since then 
BIOT has been limited to the Chagos group, or basically 
35. Ibid; p, 11, 
Diego Garcia. The motive behind their acquisition is that 
these islands are to be developed at a future movement into 
"austere-facilities" serving to restore the strategic lines 
of communication east of Suez, which were lost or placed in 
doubt by the post %*ar political evolution 'of the vast area 
37 
around the Indian Ocean, 
The Indian Ocean therefore, from 15 to 19 century 
was a trading route for raw materials and crude oil from 
Asia to Europe, The trade was on its peak during the British 
rule in India, The fall of British Empire in India trans-
formed th*e trade-oriented area into a political strategic 
vacuum. For almost 20 years since the end of World War II, 
the ocean was more or less under British dominance. But the 
devaluation problem faced by Great Britain resulted in the 
signing of an agreement between her and the United States 
in Dec, 1966, In accordance with the 1966 agreement Great 
Britain announced her withdrawal from 'East of Suez' by 1971 
and in Oct, 1972 leased the Diego Garcia island to the United 
States, The United States converted Diego Garcia from a 
modest communication site to America's primary naval-air base 
in the Indian Ocean, Thus the later half of the 20 century 
withessed the replacen«nt of "Great Powers" by the "Super 
Powers" in the Indian Ocean. 
36, JOEL LARUS; Diego Garcia: Political Clouds Over a Vital 
U,S, Base, Strategic Review, Winter, 1982, p, 45, 
Apart from the strategic location, the natural 
resources, especially the minerals found in the sea bed of 
the Indian Ocean are added attraction to the region's signi-
38 ficance, hence Super Power's interest and competition in 
the area. Petroleum and gas are found on ttie continental 
shelves of the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Bass Strait and Wes-
tern Australia; rutile and zircon found in Northwestern 
Australia; the rare earth mineral monazite is found in beach 
sands of India; diamonds, phosphorite nodules in Agulhas Bank; 
and carolline lime-stones are also found in the Indian Ocean, 
Sediments that contain enormous amounts of iron, copper, 
«langanese, and other metals have been discovered in the Red 
Sea, and chrome ores have been found in the rift zone of mid-
oceanic ridges. Besides, huge accumulation of manganese 
nodules containing numerous metals, some of them rare, lie 
in the Ocean bed. 
These are the natural resources which made the Ocean 
much more important than it was before the World War II, 
Earlier the oceans were used for shipping and fishing only, 
but today gas, oil, polymetallic nodules from which metal 
38, It has more than half of the world's prospected oil 
reserves, two-third of uranium, one-half of gold 
and practically all the diamond resources outside the 
Socialist bloc. See for details The Hindustan Times, 
Oct. 13, 1982. 
39, Encyclopaedia Britannica; Vol, 9, p. 312, 
can be extracted, and also power from the Ocean make it a 
world wide concern especially for the industrialized powers 
and more particularly for the Super Powers to have their 
foot holds, in one way or the other, in the waters or on the 
coast, of the Indian Ocean, 
These raw materials, vital for the qrowth and develop-
ment of the major manufacturing industries, made the Indus-
trialized powers to establish a significant trade relations 
with the principal Indian Ocean states (See Table I for 
United States trade links with the Indian Ocean states from 
1977 to 1980). 
The magnitude of trade opportunities and miheral 
explorations has been growing on the part of the United 
States because of the fear from the Corarounlst forces that 
might shut off the highly industrialized, raw material im-
porting coiuitries from supply produced in the Indian Ocean 
littorals. United States vulnerability in maintaining trade 
with the Indian Ocean countries increased with the emergence 
of Communist Cuba under Fidel Castro, Because Cuba had supp-
lied the United States with vital manganese, nickel and 
chromite, which under Communist influence seemed impossible. 
Because the Soviet Union felt her interest best served in 
preventing and depriving the interests of the United-
States. 
Therefore, both Super Powers have felt their own 
interest most Vital, which leads to their traditional riva-
lry (of gaining influence in every corner of the globe) 
also got reflected in this region. Added to its strategric 
as well as politico-economic significance, jthe Indian Ocean 
today is a scene of world wide interaction. 
TABI£ I - UNITED STATES TRADE WITH THE INDIAN 
EXPORTS 
CCUNTHY 
B a h r a i n 
I r a n 
I r a q 
I s r a e l 
J o r d a n 
Kuwai t 
S a u d i A r a b i a 
I n d i a 
I n d o n e s i a 
P a k i s t a n 
S r i Lanka 
A u s t r a l i a 
E t h i o p i a 
1977 
203 
2 , 7 3 1 
211 
1 ,447 
302 
6 4 8 
3 , 5 7 5 
779 
763 
29 3 
53 
2 , 3 5 6 
58 
1978 
157 
3 ,685 
317 
1 ,925 
236 
745 
4 , 3 7 0 
9 4 8 
751 
496 
63 
2 , 9 1 2 
24 
1979 
159 
1,021 
442 
1,855 
334 
765 
4 , 8 7 5 
1,167 
981 
529 
57 
3 ,617 
103 
19 
1 
7 
2 , 0 . 
41 
8\ 
5,7( 
1,6J 
1,5^ 
6^ 
i 
4 , OS 
•] 
Source* U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical 
19811 (102-d edition Washington, D.C.) 
Cited in RAIS AHMAD KHJVN; Pakistan United Stat 
p. 91. 
CHAPTER 2 
DIEGO GARCIA 
AND 
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 
Middl.S?'* ..... DIEGO 
lEi^.. GARCIA 
Receiver 
^ • • • • )Ar 
SunptsMMi 
unarlie •>< 
Site * 
••'WarchQUSts 
^barracks 
, • -
L • 1 • 
Industrial Si^^SjL^ 
airfield'!*? 
turninf basin ''^^*^j9S?^ 
Rambler BayM' 
Pt.Marianne 
^T^antmitte^ Site 
3Km 
ast 
Source: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20.5.1980, p.10, as 
cited in DIETER BRAUN, The Indian Ocean : Region of 
Conflict or Peace Zone^  1983, p. 210. 
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Diego Garcia — a horse-shoe shaped cora l a t o l l in 
the centre of the Indian Ocean — i s an i s land with a land 
are of 11 sq, miles in the Chagos Archipelago. I t i s about 
1,400 miles from the Indian coas t , 1,250 miles from Mauri-
t i u s , 650 miles from Maldives, about 2,750, miles from North 
West Cape of Aus t r a l i a , 3,400 miles fr^ om the Cape of Good 
Hope, 2,200 miles from Berbera (Somalia) and 1,900 miles'from 
Masirah Island (Oman), Si tuated in the b e l t of t r o p i c a l t rade 
winds and surrounded by vast expanses of ocean, Diego Garcia 
enjoy a more moderate cl imate than would normally be expec-
ted in loca t ions so close t o the Equator, Throughout the 
year the temperatures are around 80° F, there are no cyclones 
and very few high winds. The s o i l i s f u r t i l e , water fresh, 
inhab i t a t ion mostly temporary workers On the coconut plan-
2 
tation or the guano deposits. 
This being the location, and its central position make 
the island more strategic in the United States foreign plicy 
planning. Therefore, in the early 1960's the United States 
began to give serious attention to the Pentagon's long-range 
1. K.SUBRAHMANYAM And J,P. ANAND; "Indian Ocean as an area 
of Peace", India Quartely, (Indian Council of World 
Affairs, New Delhi), Vol, 27, No, 4, Oct-Dec. 1971 p. 290, 
2. K.P.MISRA; "New Tensions in the Indian Ocean Area',' Review 
of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol, 25, No, 575, 
March 20, 1974, p. 28. 
strategic requirements in the Indian Ocean, Washington's 
JDelated awakening to the need to improve its naval and air 
facilities and operational capabilities no longer could 
sustain Britain's role as guarantor of the peace and secu-
rity of the Indian Ocean. Britain began tq disengage; colo-
nies were given independence, bases were closed or cut back, 
and a reduced number of warships cruised the Ocean's waters. 
In Nov, 1965, the then British Prime Minister Mr, Harold 
Wilson announced the formation of the British Indian Ocean 
Territory (BIOT), Shortly after the BIOT was established, 
Britain evacuated all the 360 migrant workers from Diego 
Garcia to Mauritius, mostly to the capital city of Port 
Louis, After that in Dec. 1966 a British-American agreement 
was signed. According to the agreement, the BIOT has been 
made available to the United States for defence purposes for 
50 years. Both Britain and the United States will consult 
each other before constructing or installing facilities in 
the territory, its use by a third country will be subject 
to an agreement between the two Governments, and each Gover-
nment will normally bear its own cost of construction, ihain-
4 
tenance etc. 
3, JOEL LARUS; "Diego Garcia: Political Clouds Over a Vital 
U.S. Base," Strategic Review, Winter, 1982, p. 44. 
4. PATRIOT (New Delhi), Aug. 1, 1968. 
Britain bought the island of Diego Garcia from Mau-
5 
ritius on payment of £ 3 million Defore her independence. 
On Nov. 8, 1965 the BIOT was set up and two days latejf on 
Nou.10, 1965 Wilson Government informed the House of Commons 
that BIOT would be available for the const^ruction of defence 
facilities by the British and United States Governments, Un-
der the terms of the agreement signed on Dec, 30, 1966, Lon-
don agreed to allow the United States Defence Department, the 
use of the several BIOT islands"for the defence purposes of 
6" 
both Governments as they may arise. Following the 1966 agree-
ment. Defence Department officials inspected each of the 
islands that then made up BIOT, and after a considerable 
debate, Diego Garcia was selected as the site most comple-
mentary to the United States military presence in the Ocean. 
In early 1972 the Pentagon pressed for an extension 
of naval operations in the Indian Ocean, Among the reasons 
mentioned were that the ead of the Vietnam war was in sight, 
that the Soviet Union had made political and strategic gains 
as a result of the Indo-Pakistan war and that the Suez Canal 
5, ASIAN RECORDER, June 18-24, 1967, Vol, 13, No, 25, 
p. 7770. 
6. United States Department of State, Treaties and other 
International Agreement Series (TIAS), No, 6196. 
vas l ike ly t o be reopened. As a f i r s t move iri t h i s d i r ec t i on , 
the small naval un i t s ta t ioned in Bahrain(MIDEASTFOR) was 
7 
re inforced . On Oct, 24, 1972, a second British-American 
agreement was concluded, and i t s p e c i f i c a l l y dedicated Diego 
q 
Garcia to their joint military use, Britain authorized the 
United States to develop "a limited naval communications 
faclity" there, which was "to provide a link in United Sta-
tes defence communications and shall furnish improved commu-
nications support in the Indian Ocean for ships and state 
9" 
aircraft,-The Defence Department was authorized to construct, 
maintain, and operate naval and air facilities on the Western 
side of the island, as well as throughout the lagoon. The 
«igreement stipulated that the United States use of Diego 
Garcia was to continue for the duration of the BIOT colony 
or "until such time as no paft of Diego Garcia is any longer 
required for the purpose of the facility, which ever occurs 
first. This communication centre on Diego Gacia came into 
service at the begining of 1973 under the Department of 
7« DIETER BRAUN; The Indian Ocean, Region of Conflict or 
Peace Zone ? (OxfoidUniversity Press 1983), p, 41, 
8. TIAS, op, cit, n. 6, No, 7481, See Articles 1 (a) and 2. 
9. JOEL LARUS; op. cit, n. 3, p. 46, 
10, TIAS; op. cit, n. 6, No, 7481, Articles 20. 
Defence as a link in the world wide chain of such installa-
tions to close a gap in the highfrequency belt and to tranariiit 
11 
satellite information to the navy and airforce. 
Dieqo Garcia, from a port of United State's east or 
west coast, represents a voyage of more than 10,000 miles. 
The island acquires greater significance in tte new plans of 
U.S. foreign and naval policies because it is equally dist-
anced from Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, India and South 
East Asia, United State's Pacific Commander, Admiral John S. 
McCain declared in May 1969 that "What Malta is for the 
Mediterranean, Diego Garcia is for the Indian Ocean — an 
12 
equal distance from all important points". Over and above 
all, the United States entry into the Indian Ocean and acqu-
isition of base facilities in the waters so remote from their 
home-land, has been regarded as the continuation of what 
is called the United States sea power expansion, dates back 
to her independence. 
The United States Indian Ocean policy is indeed an 
elaboration and reinterpretation of Alfred Thayer MWian's 
1 1 . DIETER BRAUN; o p , c i t , n , 7 , p , 4 1 . 
12, United S t a t e s Naval I n s t i t u t e Proceedings (Washington), 
May, 1969, pp. 152-153. 
theory of Sea Power, Captain Mahan, a scholarly officer of 
the American Navy, propounded the "Sea Power" or "Command of 
the Sea" theory. He was inspired by the strategic principles 
which the British admiralty had been following more or less 
blindly for over 200 years. His contributi/^n lay in Just 
organizinq it into a coherent system or philosophy, 
Mahan's Sea Power theory was a rationalization ideally 
adjusted to the requirements of the case. The theory did not 
even emphasise the importance of navies in winning of wars, or 
the assumption ttet winning of wars was the decisive factor 
in the fate of peoples. Instead, it stressed that the "Comm-
and of the Sea" assured to the possessor of the potential 
strength to win battles rather than "the actual naval battles," 
It developed the significance of this "Command of the Sea" 
as a shield for maritime commerce in war time, and thus 
provided an easy transition over which to carry these ideas 
into-times of peace. By its mere existence in peace time a 
navy could still exercise "command of the Sea" for it protectod 
14 
the national trade against the threat of war. 
13. HAROLD SPROUT & MARGARET SPROUTi The Rime of American 
Naval Power 1776-1918, (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1946), p. 205. 
14, WALTER MILLIS; The Future of Sea Power in the Pacific, 
(Published jointly by. Foreign Policy Association, New 
York & World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1935), p, 7, 
Mahan says that "a navy whose primary sphere of action 
is war, is in the last analysis and from the least misleading 
point of view, a political factor of the utmost importance in 
international affairs, one more often deterrent than irritant. 
It is in that light, according to the conditions of the age 
and of the nation, that it asks and deserves the appreciation 
of the state, and that it should be developed in proportion 
15 to the reasonable possibilities of the political future. 
In the broader sense, "Sea Po'er for Mahan includes 
not only the military afloat that rules the sea or any part 
of it by force or arms, but also the peaceful commerce and 
shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and 
healthfully springs, and on which it surely rests", Mahan 
is of the view that "if a country controls all the seas, she 
controls 2/3 of the world and the remaining 1/3 can easily 
17 be controlled". 
The United State's naval epic may be said to have be-
gun with the war of the American Revolution, Though the United 
15. ALFRED T. MAHAN (Captain U.S. Navy); The Interest of Am-
erica in Sea Power, Present and Future, (Boston, little 
Brown and Company..l897), p. 171. 
16. Quoted in ^aptain W.J. RUHE (U,S. Navy Rtd.); Sea Power 
in the 70's. Proceedings U.S. Naval Institute, Vol, 96, No. 
4/806, April 1970, p. 26. 
17. Cited in MQNRANJAN BEZBORUAH; U.S. Strategy in the Indian 
Ocean; The International Response, New York, 1977, p, 3, 
States Navy was not permanently established until more than 
a decade after the close of the Revolutionary struggle. But 
the Americans had realized the importance of the study of 
naval power due to following reasons. Firstly, sea power 
played a vital role in the winning of American independence. 
Secondly, events of that struggle started a discussion of 
national defense, and of the Navy's role therein, which has 
continued to this day. Finally, Captain Mahan's reinter-
pretation, more than one hundred years later, of the naval 
operation's of the Revolutions, figured very conspiciously 
18 in the rise of the strategic principle of naval policy. 
The first two factors are inberdependent. The last, but not 
the least, is Captain Mahan's philosophy of Sea Power which 
received a good deal of success in his own time and which is 
today the basic doctrine of American Naval Policy, 
Mahan's philosophy of Sea Power was compounded from 
two distinct, if related, theories. One was a theory of natio-
nal prosparity and destiny founded upon a program of 
mercantilistic imperialism. The other was purely and simply 
a theory of naval strategy and defense. According to his 
imperialistic thesis,^ a nation must expand or else decline. 
It was impossible to stand still. 
18. SPROUT & SPROin-; op. cit, n, 12, p. 7. 
Mahan's Philosophy of ftea power entered the White 
House in the person of Theodore Roosevelt in 1901, Under 
Alfred T, Mahan's captainship and President Roosevelt's pa-
tronage the American Sea Power expanded from the Caribbean 
to the Pacific/ because of the constructicfn of an isthmian 
Canal, This inter-oceanic canal would halve the distance 
between the Pacific and the Atlantic Sea boards of the United 
States. Thus the strategic po.sition of the United States in 
the Caribbean and indeed throughout the Western Atlantic 
north of Equator, was naturally a strong one. 
In the Indian Ocean, the United States interest in 
Diego Garcia is a reflection of her policies in the Caribbean 
19 
and the Pacific, It is a step to Mahan's thesis that over-
sea colonies were necessary to sustain the naval power deemed 
so essential for the support of national diplomacy, prestige 
and commerce in distant lands and seas. In the Caribbean, 
naval officers had long desired a base but had unfortunately 
20 disagreed as to the best location. By 1909, Guantanamo Bay 
on the South East coast of Cuba was considered the best site to 
19. For more details on U.S, Policy in the Pacific See 
RICHARD L. WALKER (ed)? Prospects in the Pacific, 
(Heldref Publications, Washington D,C,) 1972, 
20. SPROUT & SPROUT? op, cit, n. 13, p. 298, 
40 
equip and fortify an insular station where a United States 
fleet in the Caribbean could readily secure fuel, supplies, 
and emergency tepairs*. With a well equipped station at 
Guantanamo, the U.S. fleet could command all the passages 
21 into the Caribbean and the Gulf of Maxico* For the Pacific, 
the Navy Board decided in 1909 to locate Its principal insu-
lar base at Pearl Harbour in the Hawilan Islands and main-
tain a small, unfortified station at Olonqapo, on Subic Bay, 
22 
about 60 miles north of Manila. Diego Garcia acquires the 
same significance in the Undian Ocean* Having an equal dis-
tance from all important points, Diego Garcia was established 
as a ccMnmunication link of the United States naval bases In 
the Pacific and the Indian Ocean from Subic Bay to Maslrah 
island in Oman. 
The primary non-nuclear mission of the United States 
Navy since 1945 huve been functionally "offensive" and have 
involved forward and world-wide deployment. The basic miss-
ions, sea control, sea projection and presence, have all been 
interpreted to invlove the deployment of power thousands of 
21. Navy Department, Annual Reportsj 1909, p. 30; 1910, p.33; 
1911, p. 24, Quoted in SPROUT & SPROUl'; op. cit, n. 13, 
p. 298. 
22. Navy Department, Annual Reports? 1909, p. 30; Navy Year 
Book, 1917, p. 309, (See SPROUT & SPROUTj, op. cit, 
n. 13, p. 301^. 
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miles from the United States. In support of these missions* 
an elaborate net-work of United States bases and support 
facilities were established in virtually every important 
strategic theater except the Indian .Ocean, Without these 
facilities, which have varied from major installations cap-
able of maintaining the largest ships in the fleet, such as 
Subic Bay in the Philippines, to visiting rights and refu-
elling arrangements, as with Singapore, the navy would not 
have been able to maintain its Asian presence and, on occasion, 
project United States power to regions such as Korea and 
23 Southeast Asia. Therefore, the United States naval build-up 
at Diego Garcia considered necessary to bolster the American 
security system In this region and to extend the strategic 
perimeter from Africa to Australia. For the deployment Of 
naval or air support over the vast expances of the Indian 
Ocean, the United States require high-speed coirununication bet-
ween their existing, widly-sepdreted bases in the Philippines 
and their coramuniciations centre at Asmara in the province 
of'Eritrea in Ethiopia, Diego Garcia, about half way between 
these two points and on the direct coute from the Red Sea 
to Australia, could also be useful to the British aa an 
alternative staging post — much as the atoll of Gan in the 
24 Maldive Islands is already used. 
23. JEOFFREY KEMP; "Threats from the Sea» Sources for Asian 
Maritime Conflict", Orbis, Vol. 19, No, 3, Fall, 1975, 
p. 1054. 
24. INDIAN EXPRESS (New Delhi), April 20, 1965. 
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The Unitt'd States naval bases at Exmouth, Cockburn 
Sound and Die'50 Garcia will enable her Polaris submarines to 
operate more effectively against almost any target in Asia, 
Accordinq to experts, these bases can be used offensively 
both aqainst the Soviet Union and China, but not vice versa. 
In fact, the naval bases in Australia — North West Cape 
Station, Alice Sprinos, Exmouth and Cockburn Sound — Dieqo 
Garcia in the Indian Ocean and Asmara in Ethiopia, from the 
United States strategic perimeter coverini the entire area 
25 from Africa to Malaysia. 
The main function of the communications base of Diego 
Garcia, for which £ 8 million had been earmarked in the 1970 
United States defence budqet, is to provide a vital link in 
U.S. nuclear deterrent. The role played by Diego Garcia will 
be to relay sing^ls from Washington to the submarine nuclear 
strike force. This capability of launchinq a retaliatary 
strike in the event of a Russian sneak attack aqainst the United 
States is considered all the more significant in terms of 
future plans because the Mediterranean no longer offers a 
26 
safe hiding place for U.S. Polaris suomarines, 
25. SATYABRATA RAI CHAWDHURI? "Indian Ocean: The Myth of 
Demilitarization". IDSA Journal, Vol. 10, No.l, July-
Sept. 1977, pp. 98-99. 
26. DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), April 23, 1971. 
It has been widely accepted that the idea of these 
27 bases IS fairly old, but the political scenario of the 
Indian Ocean in context to the United States policy planning 
has made practically urqent the desire to secure her interest 
in the Asian region. The set-back in Indo-China, the emer-
qence of Bangladesh in 1971/ and the Arab oil embargo during 
the 1973 West Asian War, are the three distinct developments 
which in their cumulative effect, convinced the United 
States strategists that they were no longer retaining their 
28 
precarious foot holds in the Afro-Asian mainland. Besides, 
the difficulty experienced by the United States during the 
Oct, War, in moving supplies from the West to Israel further 
increased the future? significance of the eastern route and 
29 
hence of Diego Garcia, The United States also learned in the 
1973 war that its Western and South< European allies 
2 7 , DAWN ( K a r a c h i ) , May 1 2 , 1 9 6 5 . 
2 8 , BASAIvJTA CHATTERJEE; " I n d i a n Ocean — Zone of P e a c e o r 
F u t u r e War ? "Mainstream (New D e l h i ) , V o l , 1 2 , No, 5 1 , 
Aug, 17 . 1974 , p , 1 2 . 
2 9 , DIETER ERAUN; o p , c i t , n , 7 , p . 4 1 . 
which are subject to Arab pressure, couibd not overfly their 
30 territories. Though the Indian Ocean supply route is a 
long one and even more difficult by the clOBvjre of United 
States bases ia Thialand, but it was thought better to have 
scanething than nothing. Therefore, the consequent upon 
these developments, the United States "decided to withdraw 
from its forward fortresses on the Asian mainland (i.e. 
Vietman) and r«establish them instead, on the island havens 
31 
of the Oceanic region!,' 
When viewed in the context of United States deter-
mination to establish a more regular naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean, the expansion of base facilities at Diego 
Garcia appears to be an integral part of new United States 
Indian Ocean strategy. It was also in response of Western fear 
of Moscow turning this third biggest of the world's oceans 
32 into a "Red Sea". The significance, the Diego Garcia 
30. RAYMOND W. COPSON; "East Africa and the Indian 
Ocean — a Zone of Peace", African Affairs (London), 
Vol. 76, Ho, 304, July 1977, p. 344. 
31. ALI MQERTODO (Maf Gen.)? "Indonesia and the Indian Ocean? 
IPSA JOURNAL^ Vol 9, Ho. 3, Jan-March 1977, p. 207 
32. CHRISTIAN TIfCS MONITOR (Boston), May 22, 1969, 
occupies is that it represented the first -'permanent' U.S. 
military presence in the Indian Ocean and therefore, may 
usher in a new era for the United States policy", Owen 
Zurhellen, Deputy Director of the United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), has said that the United 
States naval presence in Diego Garcia represented a continu-
ation of: ".legitimate and important U.S. interest". The 
base at Diego Garcia, he pointed out, "is a substantial 
symbol of active U.S. support for our trade routes, our 
freindly countries, and for the stability and peaceful evo-
lution of relations in East Africa, the Middle East and 
South Asia"?^ 
The current United States strategy in the region 
recognizes naval developments as an essential element in 
the defence of United States interests. The absence of 
proximate United State's or allied land bases and the un-
willingness of the regional states to provide such facili-
ties for an in-place foreign army and airforce, have point 
to the absolute need for maritime superiority. In this 
33. See SATYABRATA RAI CHOWl^HURIt op, cit, n. 23, 
p. 98. 
regard, the offensive capability of United States naval 
forces, sea-based tactical air superiority, and at-sea sus-
tainability of the United States fleet may compensate for 
34 the Soviet proximity/ and its naval edge in numbers. Thus 
in the light of the geographical cealitieg of the American 
position in general and the distances involved in the Indian 
Ocean in particular, the emphasis in the United States on 
35 Sea Power is understandable. 
In the late 1960's, the then U.S. Secretary for the 
Navy, Mr, John Chafee, suggested that the United States 
should watch the security implications of growing Soviet 
naval developments. He warped the United States Congress 
against any further reduction in the strength of the country's 
naval power. Earlier, a drastic budget cut had compdHed the 
U.S, Navy to "retire" some of its ships and reduce a nximber 
of its personnel which, some in the Pentagon had then 
argued was unwise thing to do in the face o£ the Soviet Union's 
34, THOMAS B, HAYWARD; "The Future of United States Sea . 
Power", U.Sy Naval Institute Proeeedinqa (Washington), 
105, May 1979, p. 68 (Quoted in RASUL B, RAIS, "An 
Appraisal of U.S, Strategy in the Indian Ocean", 
Asian Survey, Vol, 23, No, 9, Sept, 1983, pp, 144-145) 
35, iDid; p, 66, 
36 purposeful advance in various oceans. 
An Indian Ocean naval base deemed necessary for the 
United States to protect the economic arteries of the free 
world from the possible Soviet or regional threat to raw 
material supplies and trade inflow from this strategic area' 
(See TableH), The decision to upgrade the Diego Garcia 
base also seemed prompted by the possible vacating of 
United States base facilities at Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, 
The new United States policy in the Indian Ocean is 
to keep a constant watch on countries where U,S, interest 
r 
lies. In terms ^ f the plan, Washington will keep a watchful 
eye on the growth of foreign insugence in those countries 
and would move fast to nip such insurgencies in the bud. In 
this direction, the United States Army hopes to develop a 
corps of military assistance officers "trained to recoginze 
insugency in its early stages and to combat the problem faced 
37 
as a given country tries to cope with the insurgency. Such 
a capability might not be strictly necessaiy, but in the 
absence of compelling pressure to give it up, caustion is 
36, THE HINDUSTAN TIMES (New Delhi); Dec. 9, 1969. 
37. NORTHERN INDIA PATRIKA (ALLAHABAD); July 16, 1969. 
TABI£ I I : U . S . IMPORTS OF STRATEGIC MINERALS 
Minerals U.S. Imports/percentage 
Columbium 
Strontium 
Industrial Diamonds 
Manganese 
Tantalum 
Ba\axite 
Cobalt 
Chromium 
Platinum Group 
Asbestos 
Tin 
Nickel 
Cadmium 
Zinc 
Mercury 
Tungsten 
Selenixim 
100 
100 
100 
98 
96 
' 93 
90 
90 
89 
85 
81 
77 
66 
62 
62 
59 
40 
Source I U.S. Congress, House, Nonfuel Minerals Policy 
Review, 1979, p. 242, as Quoted in RAIS AHMAD 
KHAN (ed)r Pakistan United State Relations, 
Islamabad, 1983/ p. 92 
38 likely to dictate that it be maintained, Diego Garcia, in 
this respect, was considered the key and "without a base 
there, the nearest United States facility would be 6,400 km, 
39 
away, at Subic Bay in the Philippines, 
United States decision to build an' Indian Ocean Fleet 
comprising two numbered fleets would be the basic U,S. requir-
ment as their main task would be to deter local political 
adventurers. Since Mehan has advocated the idea of deterr-
ence rather than irritance, therefore, followinq his Sea 
Power theory the United States successfully sent the Enter-
prise into the Indian Ocean during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan 
War, It was, no doubt, an act of deterrence that assured 
the potential strength of the United States and made the 
world safe from one of the horrifying war in the Indian 
subcontinent. The Caban missile crisis of 1962 is also an 
example of the American act of deterrence that had reduced 
the risk of war in the Caribbean, The over-thrQV» of Shah 
of Iran, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, continued 
Iran-Iraq War and conflict in the Horn of Africa have areat-
ly influenced the projection of United States deterrence In 
40 the Indian Ocean, The establishment of base facilities at 
Diego Garcia is a part of United States foreign policy. 
After the Atlantic and the Pacific, the only ocean left for 
38, RAYMOND W. COPSON; op, cit, n, 28, p. 343. 
39, INDIAN EXPRESS (Delhi); April 1, 1974. 
40, RAIS AHMAD KHAN (ed); Pakistan United States Relations, 
Islamabad, 1983, p. 78. 
QO 
the United States naval build-up was the Indian Ocean, There-
fore, Diego Garcia was thought the most appropriate place 
for the United States to keep an active Indian Ocean pre-
sence. 
In the 1980's the United States continues to be 
uneasy at Mauritian claim on Diego Garcia as it would jeopar-
dise plans to defend vital Gulf oil resources from a U.S. 
military base on Diego Garcia Island. If Mauritius succeeds 
in its claim to sovereignty over this island. United States 
r 
would be hard pressed to find another suitable base in the 
region. The island is by far the closest American base to 
the Gulf region and the waterways that carry Middle Eastern 
oil to the United States and its allies in Western Europe 
and Asia, Washington has agreement for limited use of air-
fields and ports in Kenya, Oman, and Somalia and has been 
seeking to expand these facilities, but they would not re-
41 place fulltime access to Diego Garcia, 
In the absence of Diego Garcia the nearest United 
States base is at Subic Bay In the Philippines thousands 
of miles away. The United States decision to upgrade Diego 
41. Regarding support to Mauritius claim see THE HINDUSTAN 
TIMES (New Delhi), Aug. 25, 1982. 
81 
Garcia as a lift off base for emergency intervention in 
West Asia, followed (former) President Carter's refusal in 
the early 80's to open talks on demilitarizing the Indian 
Ocean, By doing so Carter was trying to restore the confi-
dence of the people in the region in the U.S. as the sole 
surviving power to police the vast expanse south of the 
Suez. 
CHAPTER 3 
U.S.A. AND U.S.S.R. 
DIVERGENCE OF APPROACH AND ATTITUDE 
TOWARDS INDIAN OCEAN 
( P O L I T I C A L , STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC ) 
Great Britain's «xit from and United states entry 
into the Indian Ocean entirely changed the geopolitics 
of the Indian Ocean, This vast Ocean has become an area of 
growing competition between the Soviet and American navies 
directly. Indirectly the competition, cou/i^eraction and 
contradiction remained a part of Super Power rivalry. The 
reason of the differences in their political stjategy and 
economic planninqs have the roots in history. 
Ideologically, the United States obviously dislikes 
Communism and all other totalitarian ideologies wherever 
they are found. Her main interest lie in stopping the spread 
of CoiTinunism, The political scenario has changed since the 
World War II. Now Russia and more recently Red China, had 
gained a new geopolitical base from which to expand and to 
infiltrate other countries. In the immediate postwar period 
when the military tide turned in the Eastern Europe after 
the Battle of Stalingrad (1943), the Red Army began to 
drive the Germans out of Russia, across the Eurasian plain 
to the north and toward Czechoslovakia in the south, and 
finally to the very gates of Berlin, In this process, 
Russia overran and occupied the belt of small countries 
separating Germany from the U.S,S,R, From the strategic 
point of view, the Soviet hegemony over the east-central 
Europe gave the Kremlin substantial control over an area 
to which Halford Mackinder described as the "world island". 
According to his thesis, from the "world island", any 
would-be conqueror would be in a well-nigh impregnable 
position to control the destiny of the world. But it does 
not necessarily mean that Communists will dominate the world 
in the very near future. But, infact it posed the strategic 
and defense problems for the United States and its free 
world allies including the military security of the NATO 
areas. Therefore, Soviet evacuation of that part of Europe 
over-run by the Red Army toward the end of World War II has 
remained a fixed goal of American foreign policy ever since 
1945, The Western reaction of the apprehended Red Army's 
ability to overrun Western Europe in the event of a new 
war, prompted the United States initially to formulate the 
Marshall plan for rehabilitating Western Europe's war deva-
stated economies and then create the NATO defense system as 
the sheet anchor of the free world's military efforts. 
This policy prevailed in the late 40's and through-
£n the 60's 
out the 50'a/and 70's Western policy makers were more 
!• CICIL V. CRABB Jr.; American Foreign Policy in the 
Nuclear Age, Third Edition, Harper and Row Publishers, 
Inc. (USA 1972) p. 221. 
2. Ibid; p. 222. 
concerned with the escalation of hostilities in the Middle 
East or Red China's reliance upon its nuclear arsenal to 
support an expansionist policy toward the neighbouring 
Asian States. 
In the Middle East turmoil and fennent/ engendering 
manifold controversies and antagonisms among great and small 
powers, appear endemic to the region, while the United 
States, at an early stage in its history, developed a fair-
ly well-understood body of principles that governed Amercian 
diplomatic behaviours toward Europe and Asia, it had no 
foreign policy at all for the Middle East before World War 
II, This was so because it had no vital interest in this 
faraway region. In between two world wars, American activi-
ties in the region were limited chiefly to those carried on 
by educators, missionaries, and philanthropic groups. During 
1930's American oil con^anies began to acquire a stake in 
Meddle East fields. During the World War II, the United 
States became conscious, as never before, of the strategic-
military role of the Middle East, Iran provided an indis-
pensable base from which to send war material into Russia, 
Middle East oil was essential to the allied war machine. 
The strategic importance of the Middle East arises 
chiefly upon three factors. Firstly, the Middle-East is a 
S9 
"Crossroads" or bridqe connecting the continents of Europe, 
Asia, and Africa, Land, sea and air routes criss-cross the 
region giving it a crucial role in world trade and commerce. 
Secondly, it is peculiarly vital to the West in its cold 
war strategy of containment of expansive Soviet Communism, 
Last, but not the least, is the vast oil resources of the 
Middle East which made the region strategically vital. The 
important strategic role the Middle East can play, and 
President Eisenhower's attached importance to the region 
made the United States to take keen interest in the ups and 
downs of the political situations in the Middle East, Presi-
dent Eisenhower said, the Middle Eastern people occupied 
"the most important strategic tertitory in the world, Soviet 
control of which would threaten the world balance of power 
and security of the West", Two big reasons for the Importance 
of territory from the stand-point of American strategy, 
were that it provided strategic bomber bases — considered 
vital in those early years — for the global nuclear dete-
rrent and that it contained the world's greatest resources 
4 
in oil, essential to the West in peace or in war. 
Keeping in view this sort of thinking, the American policy 
3, See JOHN C. CAI^BELL; "The Soviet Union arxS the United 
States in the Middle East" Annals of American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, (Philedelphia), Vol, 401, 
May 1972, p, 127, 
4, Ibid; p. 127. 
s« 
makers followed a defensive policy in the begining. Helping 
Greece to win Its civil war, backing Turkey against Soviet 
pressure to subvert its independence, pressing for Soviet 
evacuation of northern Iran, trying to gain the cooperation 
of Arabs and Jews as well as of Turks and Iranians, and 
buttressing or replacing a declining Britain in many of 
its historic positions particularly the Indian Ocean, in 
"denying" the Middle East to the Soviets, 
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, started playing 
their own tactics. Their first step in this direction was 
placing of naval units in the Mediterranean, which is 
considered by the Russians as a corridor to the Atlantic 
through Gibralter and to the Indian Ocean through the Suez 
Canal, The Russians has had the specific purpose of butt-
ressing Soviet freedom of action and limiting that of the 
United States, She has striven to maintain control of the 
Black Sea, to have the doors of Turkish Straits in safe 
hands, preferably its own, and to prevent the countries on 
its southern borders from being used by other powers to 
threaten Russian security. 
In this direction, Egypt has been made the center of 
Soviet Middle East strategy. Being a land bridge between 
Asia and Africa and having control of water link from the 
Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, its location had made it 
a key strategic area throughout history. But the informal 
alliances with Egypt and with "Nasserism" as a forcQ which 
could open the way to Soviet gains in the Middle East, had 
only limited success. The Soviet Union fatfed a number of 
problems in extending their influence into the Arabian 
peninsula and the region of the Persian Gulf, Despite 
these problems, the Scviet ; position in the Middle East was 
far stronger at Khrushchev's departure in 1964 than when 
he came to the leadership role a decade before. 
On the global scale the major decision — perhaps a 
direct consequence of the Cuban crisis of 1962 —• was to 
build up Soviet military strength rapidly in both strategic 
and general purpose forces. In the Middle East the new lea-
ders set out to establish a greater force in the Mediter-
ranean and by seeking naval and air facilities in a number 
of countries. They adopted a flexible policy towards 
Turkey and Iran aimed at normal and friendly relations 
without demanding the breaking of alliances with the United 
States, And in the Arab-Israeli affair they deepened the 
Soviet involvement by incjireasiiiq military aid to Egypt, 
Syria and Iraq, and generaly giving stronger political 
backing to the Arab cause. 
These chanqes in tactics in areas relatively close 
to the Soviet Union took place at a time when the Kremlin 
was lessening its involvement in more distant parts of the 
Third World and replacing the ideological campaign with a 
more practical approach. The new policies^seemed to betoken 
a new realism, taking fuller account of the fact of geog-
raphy and of military power, but also adopting a clearer 
view of how to advance the state interests of the Soviet 
Union. 
Soviet influence grew in Iraq after the revolution of 
1958, in Yemen after the Civil War began in 1962, and in 
South Yemen after the British left in 1967. Even in those 
countries however, the Soviets found themselves unable to 
establish firm positions as local political developments 
were beyond their control. Relations with Iraq deteriorated 
in the last years of the Qassem regime and grew even worse 
when the Ba'th succeeded O^ issem in 1963, In the remaining 
Arab countries of the region (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the 
British protected states of the lower Gulf) neither the ra-
dical nor Soviet influence made much headway. 
In the Indian subcontinent, the Soviet Union gained 
major access by mediating the Indo-Pakistan conflict in 
1965, India was a most desirable ally of the Soviet Union 
5, ABBAS AMIRIE (ed); Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in 
International Politics, (Tehran, 1975) p. 44, 
» • 
because of Pakistan's links with both the United States and 
the Communist China, Russia's number one enemies. In Feb, 
1968, Admiral Gorchacov visited India for providing naval 
assistance to the latter. The Soviet Union, since then, 
transferred to the Indian Navy several modern Foxtrol-type 
submarines, escort ships, Osa missile boats, various other 
craft, and a submarine, tender, Soviet technical assistance 
has enlarged the capabilities of the Indian east coast naval 
base at Visakapatnam, 
The culmination of Soviet-Indian political relations 
are found in the signing of the Aug, 1$71 bilateral treaty. 
Western reaction to this Soviet action appeared in the 
signing of 1972 British-American agreement on the establish-
ment of a United States Communication Station at Diego 
Garcia, 
Soviet influence in India was greater than that of 
any other external power, and certainly that of the United 
States and China. India's economy weakened by its much grea-
ter dependence on costly Middle Eastern oil, by its own 
econcmiic and food crisis, and by Its economic stagnation 
cum political stability, and India would like to- lower its 
dependence on Moscow by improving its relations with Washi-
7 
ngton and Peking, Moscow still wants to prevent the United 
6, NORMAN PQLMAR; Soviet Naval Power — Challenge for the 
70*s (National Strategy Information Centre Inc. N,Y, 1974) 
p. 69, 
60 
States or China from becoming predominant in India, Indeed 
because of recent Soviet losses in the Arab East, Moscow 
is the more unlikely to watot India also to slip out of 
Soviet influence, 
4 
Supporting this policy, the Soviet Union adopted 
military supplies as the foremost instrument of their diplo-
macy in the Third World, Soviet motivation in supplying 
arms to selected Indian Ocean littoral states, is to secure 
a degree of political or diplomatic influence over the re-
cipient states. The limited dimensions of Soviet economic 
aid disbursments, the small scale of Soviet trading rela-
tionships, and the infurtile ground for Soviet cultural 
penetration in those countries, have all served to under-
write the primacy of military supplies and military ins-
g 
truction in Soviet Indian Ocean diplomacy. 
According to a list drawn up by the U,S, State Depar-
tment in 1976, between 1955 and 1974 the following states 
in the Indian Ocean received significant military aid from 
the Sotri«t Union (see table III), 
8, LARRY W. BOWMAN & IAN CLARK (eds)? The Indian Ocean 
in Global Politics, Westview Press Inc, (USA, 1981), 
p. 149. 
• 1 
TABU:; 1 1 1 ^ 
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO THE INDIAN OCEAN COUNTRIES— 1955-74, 
C o u n t r i e s I n U . S . ^ ( M i l l i o n s ) 
r 
Egypt • 3,450 
Iraq 1,600 
India 1,400 
Indonesia 1,095 
Iran 850 
Afghanistan 490 
Somalia 115 
South Yemen 80 
North Yemen 80 
Sudan 60 
Pakistan 60 
9, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Conimunist States 
and Developing Counties, Report no, 198, Jan, 27, 1976, 
as quoted in MCaaORANJAN BE2BC«UAH> Us fi^trategy in 
the Indian Ocean, (Praeger, New York, 1977) p. 134. 
Besides the arms supplies, the Soviet Union made a 
healthy presence on different Indian Ocean ports. They 
established themselves on the island of Socotra in proximi-
ty to Yemen, they have a strong base in Aden, which afford 
them a supply center for actions taken on the Arabian 
Peninsula (South Yemen is as much a Soviet satellite as 
Cuba), They can send their ships into the ports of Iraq, 
India and People's Republic, In 1976 Mozambiq granted the 
Soviet Union "facilities to build air and vaval installa-
tions at Indian Ocean bases. (See map on page 63 ). 
The Soviet argument is that while acquired port 
facilities in a number of littoral states and established 
mooring buoys at various points in the western half of the 
Indian Ocean, it does not possess exclusive and guaranteed 
bases. 
"Nowhere does it (the USSR) have 
access to full service installations 
that can compare to the United States 
Navy facilities at Subic Bay in the 
10. ANTHONY HARRlGftH ^ "The Indian Ocean and U.S. Security, 
Naval Supremacy and the Willingness to Use it". 
Vital Speaches of the Day (New York), Vo, XLVI, No. 22, 
Sept. 1, 1980, p. 674. 
11, RAJAN t^ LNON? "Soviet Policy in the Indian Ocean Region", 
Current Hjstorv. April 1979, p, 179. 
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Philippines, Yokosuka in Japan, 
or Rota in Spain. United States 
bases, moreover, are usually 
secured by treaty and defended 
by American forces, whereas 
many of the ports now used by 
Moscow would be closed to Soviet 
vessels in the event of hostili-
ties"!^ 
The Soviet argument is realistic no doubt , but a 
look of an over all picture of Soviet naval presence and 
the tremendous increase in it, in the Indian Ocean will 
be more convincing. According to figures pxiblished by the 
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Australian 
Parliament, in 1968 there were a total of 6 Soviet surface 
ships, 2 submarines and 6 auxilapies vessels in the Indian 
Ocean. These figures grew to 7 surface vessels in 1969, 
7 submarines and 12 auxiliaries in 1970, In 1971, there were 
10 surface ships, but only 1 submarine made an appearance 
13 
while the auxilaries decreased from 10 to 7, On average. 
12, MICHAEL T. KLARE; "Super Power Rivaly at Sea", Foreign 
Policy, No. 21, (Winter, 1975-1976i, p. 165. 
13. GEOFFREY JUKESt "The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy" 
Adelphi Paper, No. 87 (Londoni IISS, May 1972), p. 15, 
• s 
the number of Soviet Warships deployed in the Indian Ocean 
has not exceeded 20 td 22 each year, but this figure does 
not include vessels in transit such as those moving from 
the Baltic or the Black Sea fleets around the Cape thuQugh 
14 the Indian Ocean* 
This being the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. 
Now in order to count her naVal presence, number of warships 
to be used as a guide to the total Soviet presence in the 
Indian Ocean seem to be the most accurate method, Usliig the 
•Shipday' calculation is another method, A count of the 
number of shipdays spent by the U,S, and Soviet navies in 
the Indian Ocean indicates a huge Soviet presence as conqjared 
to the total U.S. presence. These results are reached by 
multiplying the total number of ships present in the Indian 
Ocean at any period of time during the year by the total 
nximber of days. The use of this methodology indicates that 
the number of shipdays.spfent by U6itied .States DAva^ forces. 
14, AIZXAWDER O. oaSBHARDTi "Soviet and U.S. Interests in 
the Indian Ocean", Asian Sttrvcv, Vol. 15, No. 8, Aug. 
1975 (University of California Press), p. 674 
grew from 1,346 in 1971 to 1438 in 1972 and 1,560 in 1973. 
Out of this total, surface combatants (which include crui-
sers, destroyerg, destroyer escorts and mine-sweepers) spent 
a total of 670 days in 1971, 940 in 1972 and 1310 in 1973. 
Next highest are auxiliary ships, of which there were 340 
in 1971, 425 in 1972, and 670 in 1973^^ During the same 
period, the Soviet presence, as measured in the number of 
shipdays, registered a tremendous growth from 1,030 in 1971 
to 2,380 in 1972 and 2,840 in 1973, Soviet auxiliary vessels 
during this period spent a total of 1,245 shipdays in 1971, 
2,780 in 1972 and 4,350 in 1973^ Accordirig to figures 
puolished by the Defencoe Department for 1973, no less than 
850 Soviet commercial vessels travelled in the Indian Ocean 
17 in transit compared to the 250 American merchant «f||ips. A 
combined total of warships and merchant vessels shows a 
considerable increase in the Soviet presence since 1968, 
reaching a peak in 1970, levelling off in 1971 and reach-
ing another high point in 197 3. The Soviet presence was much 
15. Ibid; See also. Military Coaatruction Authorization, 
F Y 1975, Hearings, p. 144. 
16. Ibid; See also Military Construction Authorization, 
F Y 1975, Hearings, p. 144. 
17. Abid; See Also Statement of Admiral Gene R. LaRocque, 
Director, Centre for Defense Information, in Military 
Construction Authorization, F Y 1975, Heainqs, 
P. 510. 
greater in these periods than the United States, who has 
often been criticized for establishing a permanent base in 
Diego Garcia, 
The principal reasons for the Soviet Union's ini-
tlal Involvement in the Indian Ocean was the need for reci-
procal arrangements which would assist its attempts to 
break through the Western containment of its long southern 
flank affected in the 1950's principally through the Baghdad 
Pact and tq a less extent through SEATO, It was to this end 
that the Soviet Union began to construct for itself a net-
work —initially quite a modest one — of bilateral relations, 
primarily with India, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Burma and 
Egypt, At the same time it used this means to rehearse its 
own specific Third World policy, which was sharply antagoni-
stic towards the West, making use of diplomatic, economic 
18 
and ideological channels, supplemented by military aid. 
This happens because for the Soviet Union, the Western 
Indian Ocean is but one of several areas in which it is 
newly making its presence felt* Ths political realities of 
the area make it a region of considerable opportunity. 
18, DIETER BRAUNi The Indian Ocean — Region of Conflict 
or Peace Zone ? Oxfor Uniitersity Press, 1983, p, 23. 
despite the fact that it is some distance from traditional 
spheres of Soviet influence. Through its activities in the 
western Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union appears to have gai-
ned considerable prestige. 
Prom tine Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean, it 
has been observed that she had a grand strategic designs 
to dominate the Ocean and its approaches. In this perspec-
tive, Moscow began with systamatic efforts in the 1960's 
to consolidate relations with the U,A,R, at the north end 
of the Red Sea. in Aden at the South end, and in Somalia 
on the African flank, A new diplomatic style and economic 
approach to Iran, also in mind-1960*s opened important 
economic e^ cchanges between the two countries, with possible 
long-run political implications to Iran's future economic 
dependence. A large and crucial military assistance program 
brings Soviet influence to bear on India, the largest coun7 
try in the area and the one with the greatest naval future. 
Assistance to port development in Mogadiscio, Hodaida, and 
Visakapatnam, port agreements with Mauritius/ anchorage and 
landing arrangements at Aden, repair contracts in Singapore, 
inconspicious support for dissident groups in the Persian 
Gulf sheikhdoms — all these suggest a growing systematic 
and long-range Soviet intention, hardly casual or accidental. 
to assert its caoability and gain preponderance in the 
19 Indian Ocean, 
There is also a Soviet strategy in the reported com-
pletion, in July 1970, of a strategic highway from the 
U.S.S.R, through Afghanistan and Pakistan to Karachi, and 
20 thus linking the U.S.S.R, with the Indian Ocean, "The 
Times" (London) correspondent highlights that the road link 
through Pakistan is likely to be used not as a terminal to a 
naval base, but merely for the delivery of food, naval stores 
or fuel to Soviet Units cruising on the delivery sides of 
the Indian Ocean, or possibly for discreet replacement of 
submarine crews or marine Commandos, The road is much shoter 
21 
and quicker than the lond sea-haul from Vladivostok". . 
Keeping all these developments in mind, it is, 
therefore, reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union seeks 
to eject Western influence from the remainder of the peninsula 
not by direct aggression but, as occasion offers, by promoting 
rebellion against the regimes on whose friendship 
19. ALVIN J. CONTTRElX & R.M. BURRELL (eds) tThe Indian Ocean-
Its Political^', Economic and Military Importance, (Praeger, 
New York, 1972), p. 366, See also HANSON BAIDVqN;. Stra-
tegy for Tomorrow, (Haper & Row, New York), 1970, 
20. Ibid; P, 247, 
21. Ibid; p. 247; See also, A..il._.RANDEL; Soviet Moves in the 
Indian Ocean, The Times (London), Sept. 15, 1970. 
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the West's position rests. Their success or failure will 
depend on their capability to maintain a regime friendly 
to themselves in South Yemen and, with it, their foothold 
in the peninsula. It will also depend on the degree to 
which the regimes friendly to the West are susceptable to 
22 
revolutionary infection, 
Soviet Union considers the Indian Ocean area vital to 
a strategy designed to strengthen Soviet influence in the 
rimlands of Asia as a bulwark against China, In the projec-
tion of a naval presence into the Indian Ocean and the 
cultivation of the friendship of states on or near the Asian 
littoral, such as India and Ceylon, the Soviet Union plays 
a role designed to contain China in much a same fashion 
as Britain sought in the 19 century to prevent Russian 
23 
expansion southward. 
The United State's response, to the Soviet naval dev-
elopment in the Indian Ocean, has grown in light of littoral 
22, Ibid; p. 112, 
23, ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF Jr.; "Sould the United States 
Retain a Military Presence in Europe and Asia ?" 
Annals of American Academy of Political and Sofcial 
Science, Vol. 397, Sept. 1971, p. 6. 
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developments, the Soviet Union's presence, increased fears 
about the safety of sea passage in and out of the Persian 
Gulf o i l f i e ld . Given the high level of the Western World's 
dependence of Gulf o i l , sea-lane security serves as a 
powerful ra t ionale for the expansion of United States naval 
a c t i v i t i e s . 
The United States in te res t in maintaing an .effective 
presence in the Indian Ocean i s also a s t ra tegic one. 
Because, the Indian Ocean provides a great potent ial to 
the United States for i t s sea-based s t ra tegic planning agai-
nst the Soviet Union, The emplacement cf two-third of U.S. 
s t ra tegic forces under water ref lec ts the significance of 
sea-based deterrence. Since 1960, the U.S. Navy has opted 
for a fu]i-scale under-sea long-range missile program for 
25 
their advantage of mobility and lesser vulnerability. The 
increasing Soviet vulnerabality attained in land-based 
24, U,S, Defense Secretary, Admiral Zumwalt, speaking at 
Washington's National Press Club, warned that the 
"Soviet Navy would outflank the West in the Indian 
Ocean in a decade, as the Russians were now outflanking 
NATO in the Mediterranean, unless America acted" 
Sea DAILY TEI£GRAPH (London), March 4, 1971, 
2 5 . MONORANJAN BEZBORUAH; o p . c i t , n . 9 , p . 1 4 1 . 
missiles, due to the accuracy and first strike capability 
promp-tecl the U.S. strategic consideratiore to develop 
undersea offensive and defensive systems. The Indian Ocean 
offers many advantages to the United States over other areas 
of strategic deployment as it makes military targets on the 
Soviet territory most accessible from the Bay of Bengal and 
the Arabian Sea, For submarine based Polaris missile deploy-
ment against Russia, the Arabian Sea is Second only to the 
Eastern Mediterranean in terms of target coverage, and the 
area becomes relatively more attractive as the missile range 
increases, A 3,000 nautical mile system would cover almost 
the whole of China and all the Soviet Union except the eas-
tern provinces. TO underline these geographical factors, 
in 1963 the United States Navy announced the construction of 
a very low frequency (VLF) radio station in western Australia, 
and then came the news of improved Posei(5on missile system, 
2fi 
to be operational in 1970. The long-raqge submarine-launched 
poseidon missiles will make United States nuclear submarines 
able to hit the Russian "iieart land" from the Arabian Sea 
and the Bay of Bengal, on either side of the Indian sub-
27 
continent, the Indian Ocean is therefore, considered the 
logical place for the deployment of Palarls A3 and Poseidon 
missiles. 
2 6 . GUARDIAN ( M a n c h e s t e r ) ; A u g . , 26 , 1 9 7 0 . 
2 7 . DAILY TELEGRAPH ( L o n d o n ) ; A p r i l , 2 3 , 1 9 7 1 . 
At the level of regional powers, American naval 
deployment and bases could also have important objectives. 
These strategic considerations would retain validity from 
the United States Point of view inthe forcea^le future. 
Indeed, they would seem to acquire added significance in the 
Light of energy crisis. In a strategic sense, the Indian Ocean 
region first assumed axceptional importance in the 1970*s. 
The oil crisis of 1973 and its ramifications sent shock waves 
around of world. The industrial nations of the West saw how, 
in an economic war, the oil Unthe Middle East and the Gulf 
could be used as a most potent weapon aaainst all the oil 
dependent countries, whether in the East or in the West, and 
reduce them to thralldom. Indeed the developments of 1973 
and after, revealed how vital the oil supplies from the 
Indian Ocean region were for the industrized West and how 
vulnerable the West is to oil pressures, 
J 
In the history of world politics, economic calculate' 
ions play an important role in the defensive political 
strategy of the Big Powers, It was economic interests that 
lured the marintime powers of the West to enter the Indian 
Ocean which eventually led to the establishment of colonial 
rule in Asia and Africa, Though decdonization has led to 
/Of 
an attenuation/these interest, the econimic links of Big 
741 
Pbwerswith the littoral areas are still strong and these 
considerations play a major part in the Indian Ocean poli-
^, . 28 ticis. 
Just before World War I the Royal Navy switched from 
coal to oil, and it was for the first time that oil became 
important in British planninq. From 1908,, when the Anglo-
Persian oil company struck oil in Southern Persia, to the 
present day, oil exploration and oil exploilation have 
transformed the scene completely. The major oilfields in 
Kuwait and in Dhahran in Saudi Arabia have been shown to 
29 
contain over three-fifths of the worlds proven oil reserves. 
These are oil fields all down the southern coast of the Guilf, 
in the island of Bahrain, in Qatar, in Abu Dhabi, even in the 
remote and deliberately self-isolated State of Oman. 
American interest in the reqion developed only in 
mid 1960's just after the- announced British intension of 
military withdrawal from east of Sues, A Washington report 
aaid on Jan. 12 (1968) that the U.S. Secretary of State 
Mr. Dean Rusk, has strongly urged the British Foreign Secre-
tary, Mr, George Brown to maintain British military presence 
in the Persian Gulf unitl the West Asia crises cooled off. 
28, S.S.BHATTACHARYA; "Economic Interests of Big Powers in 
the Indian Ocean Region."IDSAJournal, Vol. 10, no. 3, 
Jan-March, 1978T p. 261. 
29, D,C. WATT; "The Decision to withdraw from the Gulf", 
The Political Quarterly (London), Vol. 39, No. 3, 
July-Sept., 1968, p. 312. 
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The United States believes this military presence helps to 
stabilize the explosive oil-producing areas along both sides 
30 
of the Gulf, British withdrawal from the Gulf coincided 
with a growing alarm in the Nixon administration over the 
repid depletion of the world's reserves of fossil fuels, 
4 
which was emerging as an item of significance in the United 
States calculation of options in the Arab-Israeli dispute, 
, As a result, in 1971 the United States increased its diplo-
matic representation in the Gulf and negotiated with the 
government of Bahrain for the station of facilities there 
for the small United States Middle East naval force. These 
facilities had been leased from the British. 
V 
The United States, in the beqining refused to take 
responsibility of the vast Afro-Asian region. Asked if the 
United States intended to fill the vacuum left by the British 
30. ASIAN RECORDER, Vol, 14, N©. 7, Feb. 12-18, 1968. 
pp. 8177-8178. 
31, U.S. Congress, House, ccanmittee on Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, 
U.S. Interests in h^<i Policy toward the Persion Gulf 
Hearings, 92 Congress, 2 Session, Feb. and Aug. 
1972, p. 23. 
withdrawal, a spokesman of the State Department said, at present 
"we have no plans to move in where the Britij-h forces pull out^ . ' 
But this does not mean that the interests of the United States 
are not affected. On the contrary, the United Si.ates can not be 
indifferent to the prospects of local conflicts breaking out in 
the Gulf and the possibility of Nasset arv^ * through him, the 
Soviet Union Increasing their influence in the Middle East, It 
is even more concerned, not only by local instability but also 
by China, Nor can the Americans be happy that the unpopular 
burden of containinq Communism in South-east Asia would devolve 
entirely upon them. Most important, they feared that Great 
Britain's withdrawal would weaken them on the flank of their ope-
33 
rations in Vietnam which may not be concluded by 1971, * 
Therefore, starting with a defensive mcTod, the United 
States policy planners enter into the politico-economic-
strate:?ic significance of the region. The United State's main 
interest in maintaining an effective presence in the Indian 
Ocean is strategic. And these strategic considerations seem 
to acquire added significance in the light of energy crisis of 
1973, Because oil does not only serve as a source of fuel or 
energy but the Eurooean economy is so much depended on 
Middle East oil that the latter (Middle East) has th<- whole 
European economy in her oil supply. As has been proved 
32, ASIAN RECORDER, Vol, 14, No. 28, July 8-14, 1968, p, 8417 . 
33, J, FRANK!' L; "East of Suez, The Aftermath" the Year hook of 
World Affairs, Vol 23, 1969, p, 28, 
by the 1967 Arab- I s rae l i f i gh t inq . The Arab oi l -producing 
s t a t e s were induced t o embargo o i l exports to B r i t a i n and 
Western Germany, The o i l con t rac t s have to be met by purchas-ta— 
sources 
ing o i l from the do l l a r /o f North America and the CariJibean, 
As a r e s u l t , the s t r a i n on s t e r l i n g was c e r t a i n l y a major 
factor in the c r i s i s which led t o the devaluat ion of pound in 
Nov. 1967?^ 
The oil riches of the Persian Gulf make the Soviet 
Uniiah ,, and even more the United States, all the more likely 
to project naval power into the Indian Ocean and the Persion 
Gulf, The Soviet Union wants to contain and if possible, to 
lower U.S, influence in the area, the more so because the 
United States is more dependent on it and, therefore, more 
35 
vulnerable concerning it. It has been anticipated in U.S. 
policy planning that if the United States were ever emancipated 
from Middle Eastern oil, its political behaviour would un-
doubtedly change. Because the companies producing and dis-
tributing their petroleum products are from the West, The 
markets to which they are distributed are raostiy in the 
Western world. Demands for local development and Imported goods 
generated by petroleum revenues are l^Tg^f^^tivif^&^^ 
36 
Western enterprises. 
• , J ^ ^ g ^ ^ . . , . . ^ 
34. D.C. WATT; op. cit, n. 29, p. 312. ' ' '-
3 5 . ABBAS AMIRIE ( e d ) ; o p , c i t , n , 5 , p , 20 
3 6 . A.J.CQTTRELL & R.M. BURRELL ( e d s ) ; Op. c i t . n . l 9 , p . 1 2 1 . 
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Oil prices have risen precipitously because of coordi-
nated, successful pressure by the Orqanization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), of which the most important members 
are Saudi Arabia and Iran. It was for the first time that 
underdeveloped countries have successfully bargained, COIIT 
ectively with the developed world, for drastically higher 
prices for their primary products. The Soviet Union as the 
largest producer of oil (18% of world production) has encouraged 
the price hikes ordered by the OPEC, and has been one of the 
highest beneficiaries of those hikes. It does not need to 
import oil, but it did obtain oil from Iraq in exchange for 
arms and sold it to Europe at high prices. 
During and immediately after the 1973 war, as it may 
again, the world energy crises was made acute because the 
political instability of the Middle East and the limitation 
of oil production by the Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OAPEC) Endangered the security and 
stability of oil supplies. During the war OAPEC limited over 
all oil products and cut off shipments to the United States 
and the Netherlands, The cut off to the United States was 
provisionally lifted on March 18, although by that date it 
was no longer particularly effective, because of the oil comp«.< 
nie's reallocations of supply and Libyan and Iraqi non-
37 
compliance with the boycott. 
The oil embargo and the cut backs imposed by the 
Arab states in 1973-74, motivated by political consider-
ations' aroused serious concern in the United States and 
created tension in Arab-United States relations. The rapid 
and steep rise in oil prices that took place at the same 
time, on OPEC rather than Arab initiative and for economic 
rather than political reasons, also '-aroused concern. It 
could have been more serious effects because it was not 
temporary and appeared to place financial obligations on the 
economies of consuming countries they would find difficult 
3 R 
or impossible to meet. 
The Middle East oil is rapidly become more essential 
to the United States because of rapidly rising demands. 
By 1980, demand projections indicate that the United States 
will -"let 3 5% of its oil from the Middle East as compared with 
8% in 1972. And also due to technological lead-times major 
substitution for Middle East oil is generally agreed to be 
impossible during the next decade. Therefore, bareing an 
unlikely drastic limitation of consumption, increased U.S. 
37. WILLIAM E, GRIFFITHy "The Fourth Middle East War the 
Energy Crisis and U.S, Policy", Orbis, Vol, 17, No. 4, 
Winter 1974, pp, 1175-1176. 
38. AbBAS AMIRIE (ed); Op. cit, n, 5, p, 48, 
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dependence on Middle East oil for the rest of this decade 
remains inevitable. This means that to maintiin its projec-
ted oil consumption in the 1970's the United States will cont-
inue to be dependent on the growth of Arab and especially 
39 Saudi production. 
Following the Oct. war, arms sales to the Gulf area 
and the associated United States involvement in regional 
security planning must be regarded as the significant feature 
of United States Indian Ocean policy. It has been argued 
that being self-sufficient in petroleum, the Soviet bloc 
has no reason to covet them and that, the Western interests 
would remain largely unaffected. Because the "Soviet bloc 
would not wish to purchase oil, and the Arabs would not oe 
/t° 40 
able/drink it". This argument satisfied the West that the 
Arabs will not embargo oil for long time. But there is the 
poisiDility, the U,s, Policy makers have argued, that Soviet 
pre-eminance in the Indian Ckrean might increase the poss-
ibility of sabotage or disruption of oil flow by the pro-
Moscow radicals in the Persian Gulf« Wius the projection of 
Soviet threat to the Gulf oil and energy dependence of the 
West have rationalized United States military Infra-structure 
41 In this area. The United States Importing 16% of Its 
3 9 . WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH; o p , c l t , n . 37 , p p . 1174 and 1178 . 
4 0 . A.J .CarTRELL & R.M.BURRELL ( e d s ) ? Op. c l t , n , 1 9 , p , 112 
4 1 . RAIS AHMAD KHAM ( e d ) f P a k i s t a n U n i t e d S t a t e s R e l a t i o n s , 
I s l a m a b a d , 1 9 8 3 , p . 8 6 , 
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petroleum supplies is not so dependent on Persian Gulf oil, 
but the loss of petroleum from this region would cause irrepar-
able damage to its Western and Asian allies, especially Great 
Britain and Japan, 
The stakes, for United States, in the Indian Ocean are 
of highest magnitude. United States success in gaining strategic 
dominance of the Indian Ocean — an area extending from the 
east African coast to the south east Asian peninsula ~ would 
place in jeopardy the United States-Western Europe — Japan 
42 
nexus, whose very existance depends upon the flow of oil from 
the Middle East, The security of the Indian Ocean supply lines 
is, therefore, vital to the United States because of the 
econQmic needs of its principal trading partners. Therefore, 
the main strategic objectives of the United States in the 
Middle East are to prevent or atleast postpone a fifth Middle 
East war, to contribute to an Arab-Israeli settlement, and 
to limit Soviet influence, to prevent developments in that the-
ater from worsenina United States alliance relationships, to 
ensure adequate Middle East oil supplies to the United States 
from becoming more than marginally dependent on Arab oil, 
43 
and to guarantee the independence and security of Israel, 
I 
In the so called crescent of crisis. United States faces many 
42. RICHARD C. THORNTON; "South Asia: Imbalance on the Sub-
continent", Orbls. Vol. 19, No. 3, Fall, 1975, p, 872. 
43, WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH; op. cit, n, 37, P, 1184, 
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threats and troubles. Vital United States interests in this 
region, than in any other area of the v7orid arf threatened 
ty Soviet a>:pansionism. Former U.S. Secretary of State, 
Alexander Haiq declared that the United States faces "a 
delerioratinq secruity situation" in the Middle Last and 
Persian Gulf reqion and a "qrowinq threart" from the Soviet 
44 Union, 
Therefore, the United States foreign policy in this 
reqion aimed at furthering the military security of the nation 
by building-up its strategic v;orld position in relation to 
the USSR and China so as to act as a powerful deterrent to 
those countries to either waqe war on Western Europe (consider-
ed vital to the United States after its home land) or to extend 
45 
f u r t n e r Communist i n f l u e n c e and c o n t r o l anyv/here in the world, 
ThlJs i t i s t h e Uni ted S t a t e s p o l i c y t o a c q u i r e and b r i n g i n t o 
c o n t r o l as much t e r r i t o r y t o t h e south of t h e USSR and China 
as p o s s i b l e , in o r d e r t o b r idge t h e gap in United S t a t e s con-
t r o l of t h e a i r space beyond t h e sou the rn e x t r i m i t i e s of t h e 
communist wor ld . 
The pr imary purpose of Uni ted S t a t e s armed fo rce s i s t o 
p r e v e n t war fa re from o c c u r i n g . I t i s w i t h i n i t h i s g e n e r a l coil-
t e x t of t h e peace t ime use of m i l i t a r y power t h a t U .S . armed 
f o r c e s aoroad assume a s p e c i a l , r e l e v a n c e t o r diolomacy, 
44. ACHILLAS N. SAKI.LL; (former S t a t e Dept , O f f i c i a l and l a t e r 
U ,S , Delega te t o t h e U.N, Ccnte rence on Human R igh t s in 
Geneva) ; "Es t ab l i shmen t of a U . S . I n d i a n Ocean F l e e t C r u c i -
a l l y important ' ; A t l a n t i c Community Quarterly,Summer, 1981 
p. 222, 
45. Indian Councilxo^aMorld Attairs, Defence and Security in 
the Ihaian Ocedn Area (Hew Delhi, 1Q58), p. :I53 
For the disposition and movement of military units and weapons 
convey implicit messages to foreign powers with respect to the 
intentions and interests of the United States, A,U.S. military 
presence measurably affects the attitudes and receptivity of 
other governments to the diplomacy of the United States. The 
manipulation of military power overseas, thus, should be viewed 
46 
as a matter of highest statecraft. 
The chancing United States relationship with Iran and, 
to a lesser extent with Saudi Arabia played a significant 
part in future United States policy. From 1971 the two powers 
47 
were referred to as the "twin Pillars" of Western security 
interests in the Gulf,, Between 1971 and 1973 the United 
States firmly assigned Iran the type of regional role the 
Nixon Doctine anvisaged for pro-Western Middle-sized powers. 
As a result, the Shah of Iran announced in Nov, 1972 the 
extention of Iran's "security perimeters" from the Persian Gulf 
and the Gulf of Oman to the Western Indian Ocean, The Iranian 
Government commenced constiruction of a naval and air base at 
48 
Chah Bahar. 
46, D,W,TARR., "The American Military Presence Abroad". , 
Orbis, Vol, 9, N, 3, Fall, 1965, p. 631, 
47, LARRY W. BOWMAN & lANCLARK (eds); op, cit, n. 8, p. 115, 
48, See map on page 63. 
To sum up, therefore, in the Indian Ocean region, each 
Super Power follow more closely and be involved more deeply in 
regional developments. As an obvious corallary, the deeper the 
Super Power commintment, the more certain it becomes that the 
issue will assume international strategic importance. Both are 
present in the area with naval power, each wishing to be sure 
that the Indian Ocean is not left to the apparant dominance 
of the other, and each making sure that its naval vessels 
are visible from time to time in the region. The competition 
in those waters, of course, is part of the global balance 
of naval and other forms of military powers. 
Since both the Soviet Union and the United States have 
sought to define their interests in the region, bilateral 
relations with the littoral states have involved issues and 
concerns that are only indirectly related to Super Power 
competition. The main reasons in establishing Super Power naval 
military presence in the Indian Ocean is mutual fear and over-
developed sensitivity concerning security. The development of 
naval units of both Super Powers in the Indian Ocean, in add-
ition to being part of the policy of showing the flag and 
of influence building, seems primarily to be dictated by 
global strateqic considerations. Since each does not trust 
the other, both are maintaining a strong defence posture and 
a balance of nuclear strength. 
Though Soviet Union expresses its readiness to end 
the ocean rivalry on conditions of the equality and equal 
security, U.S. claims that Its naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean enhanced the security climate in the region and there-
fore inhibits otherwise potentially hegemonic attempts. For 
United States, nav^l forces operating on the high seas could 
not be considered "foreign" since oceans by definition are 
interational. Thus the United States feels removal of Great 
Power naval forces from the Indian Ocean would not only set 
aside a basic international right, but also create an oppor-
tunity for an even more dangerous military imbalance to the 
deteriment of regional security. The Soviet Union, on the other 
hand, did not consider anideal state of affairs when the 
navies of Great Powerscruise for long periods far away from 
their shores. 
CHAPTER t. 
CONCLUSION 
The Soviet-U.S, rivalry in the Indian Ocean highli** 
ghts the growing strategric and economic importance of the 
area. As a result, the region is witnessing a formidable 
concentration of naval power, with an unchallenqing and 
dominant United States position. 
The later half of the 1960's mark the Super Power's 
interests and presence in the region, the 70*s can not be 
ignored althogether, as major developments of the region 
took place in this period. At the end of the 1970's the 
developments in the Horn of Africa, establishment of the 
leftist regime in Afghanistan, the overthrow of Daood, the 
mounting stake of the Western investors in West Asia, foll-
owing a boom in petrodollars and the loss of the United 
states power in the Gulf region after the disposition of 
the Shah of Iran, United States is facing a major challenge 
to its power and prestige in this region. In this context 
the upgrading of the Diego Garcia base becomes a logical 
necessity for the United States to retain its Big Power 
image. The persistent build-up of the U,S, military pre-
sence in the Indian Ocean was prompted by a desire to 
safeguard 'vital U,S, interests' in South and South West 
Asia with the instruments of watching and, where possible, 
balancing the Soviet moves in the region. In this direc-
tion, the then U.S, President formulated the 'Carter 
Doctrine', defining the Gulf as an area vital to U,S, in-
terest, as a direct consequence of the Soviet military 
intervention in Afghanistan, Washingtan's ensuing policy 
ay 
involved improving its military and strategic position in 
the vicinity of the Gulf, and strengthening its naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean as well as setting up a Rapid 
Deployment Force to make up for the Soviet Union's geo-
strategic advantage. The Soviets took counter-measures, 
particularly in the southern Red Sea and in the Gulf of Aden. 
All these measures were steps in a process of escalation 
which repadly led to a more unyielding confrontation bet-
ween the Super Powers, the contours of which become sharper 
in the 80*s. 
Both sides offset their grievances against each other, 
and in so doing each followed its own line of reasoning. 
Trust replaced by mistrust and diplomacy was made to serve 
a new confrontationist attitude. 
The idea of neutralizing the Indian Ocean through 
the exclusion of all foreign warships has gained some 
currency with the weaker littoral states, when the Indian 
Ocean Peace Zone strategy developed on the initiative of 
Sri Lanka, India and Tanzania out of the Non-Aligned Sum-
mit at Lusaka in Sept, 1970, But the supporters of the 
Peace Zone concept, in the real sense of the term, are not 
the apostle of peace,as their target is only the United 
States, They only point the accusing finger at the bases in 
Diego Garcia, in Oman, Bahrain, and Sc»nalia, etc. They draw 
attention to the attempt of the United States to threaten 
independent peoples of the Indian Ocean, and charge it with 
violating the United Natians resolution on the Indian Ocean. 
But they fail to understand that the Indian Ocean Zone of 
Peace movement should not support the sijbstitution of one 
Super Power by another Super Power. The security situation 
in the Indian Ocean region is currently characterized by 
the military occupation of a hinterland state by a Super 
Power, serious armed conflict between neighbouring states, 
and civil strifes. In view of these new developments it is 
inconceivable that the United States navy or the navies of 
the West European contries would stay out of the Indian 
Ocean reoion under any circumstances as long as the Soviet 
threat to this region, so vital to Western security, looms 
large. In order to analyse the sources of real security 
threats to the region and as a step in the process of 
constructing a firm basis for a Zone of Peace requires a 
significant irt^rovement in the security climate of the 
region. It is a mistake and indeed it is inconsistent 
and contradictory to the attempt to implement a Zone of 
Peace while one of the hinterland state (Afghanistan) in 
the region continues to be illegally occupied by one of 
the Super Powers, 
The United States has always a defensive attitude 
in the Indian Ocean, But the Soviet Union's preventive 
80 
approach and advance in the area have created a new situa-> 
tion in the Indian Ocean politics. With her intervention 
in Afghanistan, the' Soviet forces are only about four hund-
red miles away from the vital oil region of the Gulf, posing 
a major threat to access to oil from the Gulf and oil ship-
ments through the Strait of Hormuz, Similar Soviet threat is 
also to the supplies of raw materials and minerals from 
Africa to the West, Prom the point of view of the Western 
countries, therefore, the most crucial thing for the 
safeguard of their interests in the Indian Ocean region is 
to frustrate the Soviet effort to gain control over the 
region or ever any strategic part of it such as the Gulf, 
Because the interest of the industrialized nations of the 
West would be damaged if the Soviets were either to gain 
control over oil supplies from the Middle East or to be in 
a position to disrupt the communication channels through 
the Indian Ocean in time of crisis, and the West would be 
ruined if an economic war were fought with the Qulf under 
Soviet control. 
The regional littoral states are much more concerned 
with their own security, that is, security against military 
threat of any sort. Visibly and rationally it does not apply 
to the United States naval presence in the Indian Ocean as 
90 
it did not, so far effect the security of any littoral or 
hinterland state. Instead, It claims that her presence 
enhances the security environment in the region. Where as 
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has ttemendous impli-
cations for the security of the Indian Oqean region. It 
has shown, above all, that the Soviet scheme to expand its 
frontiers by the use of force is still in operation. In 
the history of the modern world, the Soviet Union is the 
only country with an unbroken record of continuous terri-
torial expansion over three and a half centuries. Therefore, 
in the light of history. Super Power activities in the 
region seem more dangerous for the security of the region. 
The equally massive Soviet naval programme and the ever-incr-
easing politico-military activities of the Soviet Union In 
the Indian Ocean region have made it abundantly clear that 
the aim of the Soviet Union also in the region is to gain 
dominance. But from the global stategic point of view the 
Indian Ocean offers exclusive advantage to the Western 
Powers over the Soviet Union since the Trident - 1 submarine 
launched missiles from the Indian Ocean can hit the Soviet 
industrial areas of southern Russia, From that anqel Western 
(especially United State's) naval presence in the Indian Ocean 
can deter the Soviet Union with increasing efficiency 
from undertaking any adventure and simultaneously reduce 
Soviet naval pressures in other waters also. Significantly 
ei 
the Indian Ocean provides no similar advantage for the 
Soviet Union since it cannot operate from there against 
any U.S. or West European targets. The demand, therefore, 
to keep the Indian Ocean free from the Western naval and 
military presence could in effect be of Kelp in meeting 
the strategic needs of the Soviet Union. 
It should be conceded, in the light of history, as 
well as the modern facts of power and vested interests, 
that the h<^es of neutralization and demilitarization of 
the Indian Ocean seem to be remote and idealistic. The 
basic problem is that, since the littoral states do not have 
the means to make the Indian Ocean a 'mare Clausum', its 
neutralization would require the consent of the Great Powers* 
and the possibility of such an act of self-denial is very 
little, as both of them abstained from the vote on the ques-> 
tion in the United Nations General Assembly and their talks 
in Moscow, Washington, and Bern on the jproposal to make 
the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace reveal their reluctance of 
keeping their navies out of the Indian Ocean, 
In addition, ttM Unitsd States put forward a 
legal stand in support of its naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean, and affirms that the right to peaceful use, transit, 
and over-flight of the world's oceans and seas by all nations 
9S 
is fundamental. In fact naval forces operating on the high-
seas cannot be considered 'foreign' since these areas are 
by definition international. United States naval presence 
in the Indian Ocean island will be more effective in view 
of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan^ Although the 
Soviet Union made futile attempts to mislead the world into 
believing that there was some legal basis for the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan but still no available evidence 
clearly shows its legality. 
The Soviet Union, now has to adopt a much more legal 
ai^ proach to convince the littoral states of the Indian Ocean 
who have reduced their hostilities to the United States 
military presence, especially after the Soviet Intervention 
in Afghanistan and the continuing turmoil in Iran, 
Regarding the Peace Zone concept, the United States 
believes that the establishment of a realistic Zone of 
Peace in the Indian Ocean region must of necessity take Into 
account all elements which affect the stability and security 
of the region. Such an effort must include an evaluation of 
the propensity of states to use military forces in the 
region in contravention of the United Nations Charter and 
foundamental norms of international behaviour. 
The possibility, therefore, of keeping the Indian 
Ocean free from the activities of the Big powers seem to 
be remote. It would be perhaps more fruitful to forestall 
the possibility of any single Big Power dominating the Indian 
Ocean, If no check is available Super Powers will continue 
to dominate the region. 
Chinese are more realistic when they point out that 
the idea of the Zone of Peace has not been implemented even 
after a laps of 20 years since initiatives were put forward 
lay in the Super Power rivalry for hegemony in the region 
and their military expansionist activities there. 
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